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    Wipe off that past reputation:  
    You are not rulers. You do not  
    belong to the ruling class; you 
belong to the servants. Make the people 
feel that you are their servants and 
friends, maintain the highest standards 
of honour, integrity, justice and fair-
play. If you do that, people will have 
confidence and trust in you
and will look upon you as
friends and well-wishers.
Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Address to 
the Gazetted Officers at Chittagong, 1948
»
«
Acknowledgements
3
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my gratitude to all the people who have supported me with ideas,
infrastructure, translations and good discussions, splendid humour and del icious food
during my field studies in Swat, Hazara, and Peshawar:
Jean-Marie Samyn for his valuable support both in Pakistan and Switzerland, and the
pleasant company; Abdullah Khan Khattak for opening me the doors to all levels of the
Forest Department; Javed Akhtar, Azmat Hayat and Asad Ullah for their support during
my field visit to Swat; Javed Hussain, Muhammad Zahid Faruq and Sardar Muhammad
Arif for their support in Hazara; Babar Shabaz for his company and friendship during
January in Hazara; Ashraf Khan, Zahir Shah and Muhammad Khan for their excellent
driving skills and/or their logistical support; the whole staff at FMC-SU for their help
and the splendid tea times we spent together; and many others.
In addition, I would like to thank Dr. Urs Geiser for the excellent supervision and many
good inputs during the preparation of this study before and after my stay in Pakistan; Dr.
Abid Suleri for his constructive criticism; my parents Erika and Hans Steimann for the
ongoing support of my studies; N C CR North-South for the f inanc ia l support; and
Intercooperation, Berne, for giving to a geographer the opportunity of a four-month
training in a forestry project.
Decentrali z ation & Participation in the Forestry Sector of NWFP, Pakistan – The Role of the State
4
Acronyms
ACR Annual Confidential Report
ADB Asian Develop ment Bank
BO Block O fficer (= Forester)
CCB Citi z en Com munity Board
CCF Chief Conservator of Forest
CDEGD Com munity Develop ment , Ex tension and Gender Directorate
CD O Com munity Develop ment Organi z er (or: O fficer)
CF Conservator of Forest
DC District Council
DFO Divisional Forest O fficer
FC Frontier Constabulary
FD Forest Department
FFE Female Forest Technician
FG Forest Guard
FMC Forest Management Centre
FMC-SU Forest Management Centre Support Unit
FSMP Forestry Sector Master Plan
FSP Forestry Sector Project
GF Gu z ara Forest
GoNWFP Government of the North-West Frontier Province
GoP Government of Pakistan
HRM Institutional Develop ment and Human Resources Management Directorate
IC Intercooperation , Swiss Organi z ation for Develop ment and Cooperation
JFM Joint Forest Management
JFMC Joint Forest Management Com mittee
JFMP Joint Forest Management Plan
JFT Junior Forest Technician
KIDP Kalam Integrated Develop ment Project
MMA Muttahida Majlis-i-A mal
MNA Mem ber of National Assem bly
MPA Mem ber of Provincial Assem bly
NGO Non-Governmental Organi z ation
NRM Natural Resource Management
NTFP Non-Tim ber Forest Product
NWFP North-Western Frontier Province
PF Protected Forest
PFRI Provincial Forest Resource Inventory
RF Reserved Forest
RO Range Forest O fficer
SAFI Sarhad Awami Forest Ittehad
SDC Swiss Agency for Develop ment and Cooperation
SDPI Sustainable Develop ment Policy Institute
SFDP Siran Forest Develop ment Project
SFPMD Social Forestry Project Malakand and Dir
SFT Senior Forest Technician
SRSP Sarhad Rural Support Project
TA / DA Travel Allowance /  Daily Allowance
TC Tehsil Council
UC Union Council
VC Village Council
VDC Village Develop ment Com mittee
VLUP Village Land Use Planning /  Plan
WO Women Organi z ation
Introduction
5
Content
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 3
ACRONYMS 4
CONTENT 5
1 INTRODUCTION 8
1.1 Research context 8
1.2 Hypothesis and research questions 9
1.3 Methodology and fieldwork 10
1 .3 .1 Selection of the research area 10
1 .3 .2 Methodology 10
1 .3 .3 Fieldwork 11
1.4 Existing Research and the geographical context 12
1 .4 .1 Present state of research 12
1 .4 .2 The geographical contex t 13
1.5 Structure of this study 13
2 DECENTRALIZATION: THEORETICAL APPROACHES 15
2.1 Preliminary remarks 15
2.2 Three main types of decentralization 15
2 .2 .1 Deconcentration or ad ministrative decentrali z ation 16
2 .2 .2 Fiscal decentrali z ation 16
2 .2 .3 Devolution or democratic decentrali z ation 16
2 .2 .4 Other types and interpretations of decentrali z ation 17
2.3 Why decentralize? 17
2.4 Conditions for success 18
2.5 Possible impacts of decentralization 19
2.6 Main problems and hindering factors 21
2.7 Decentralization and natural resource management 21
2.8 Criterias for assessing decentralization efforts in NWFP forestry 23
3 FORESTS AND THEIR INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN THE NWFP 27
3.1 NWFP: area and main characteristics 27
3.2 Forests in the NWFP 28
3 .2 .1 Forest cover and tree species 28
3 .2 .2 Legal categories of forests 29
Decentrali z ation & Participation in the Forestry Sector of NWFP, Pakistan – The Role of the State
6
3 .2 .3 Im portant forest stakeholders 30
3 .2 .4 Demand , supply and pressure 31
3.3 Past initiatives in NWFP forestry 32
3.4 Recent and current initiatives 33
3 .4 .1 Recent initiatives in planning and legislation 33
3 .4 .2 Current reform of the legal framework 33
3.5 Institutional reforms: the NWFP Forestry Sector Project (FSP) 34
3 .5 .1 Principles and objectives 34
3 .5 .2 Reorgani z ation of the department 35
3 .5 .3 Village Land Use Planning (VLUP) 36
3 .5 .4 Current situation 37
3.6 Joint Forest Management (JFM) 38
3 .6 .1 Joint Forest Management in the NWFP 38
3 .6 .2 The JFM approach and its ex periences 38
3 .6 .3 Integration of JFM and VLUP 39
3.7 Local Government 39
3 .7 .1 Background 39
3 .7 .2 Principles and structure 39
3 .7 .3 Current situation in the NWFP (as per June 2003) 41
4 SELECTED STAKEHOLDER GROUPS 42
4.1 Territorial Staff of the Forest Department 42
4 .1 .1 Staff and their roles and functions 42
4 .1 .2 Formal and informal assets: Range O fficer 44
4 .1 .3 Formal and informal assets: Forester and Forest Guard 44
4 .1 .4 Legal framework and its interpretation 46
4 .1 .5 Internal reform: awareness and criticism 47
4.2 CDEGD Staff 48
4 .2 .1 Roles and functions 48
4 .2 .2 Formal and informal assets 49
4 .2 .3 Internal reform: awareness and criticism 51
4.3 Local people 51
4 .3 .1 Environmental setting: resources and their condition 51
4 .3 .2 Socio-economic setting: livelihood assets 52
4 .3 .3 Forest use and ownership of shares 53
4 .3 .4 Main priorities for develop ment 53
4 .3 .5 Awareness and acceptance of local com mittees 54
4.4 Local Government 54
4 .4 .1 Forest Protection Com mittees (FPCs) 54
4 .4 .2 Farm forestry 56
5 RELATIONS BETWEEN SELECTED STAKEHOLDERS 57
Local people – Territorial Staff and CDEGD Field Staff 57
5 .1 .1 Perception of legal situation and forest ownership 57
5 .1 .2 Permit procedure and quotas 58
5 .1 .3 Forest protection by the Territorial Staff 60
5 .1 .4 Reasons for deforestation as seen by villagers and TS 61
5 .1 .5 Co-operation on VLUP /  JFM 63
5 .1 .6 Co-operation on Women Organi z ations (WOs) 68
Introduction
7
5.2 Territorial Staff – CDEGD Staff 69
5 .2 .1 De ju re co-operation on VLUP / JFM 69
5 .2 .2 De f acto co-operation on VLUP / JFM 69
5 .2 .3 Mutual perception and acceptance 71
5 .2 .4 Situation of female CD Os and Female Forest Ex tensionists 72
Forest Department – Local Government 72
5 .3 .1 Co-operation of FD with Forest Protection Com mittees on district level 72
5 .3 .2 Other (informal) interaction 73
Local people – Local Government 74
5 .4 .1 Activities of Local Government on village level 74
5 .4 .2 Perception of Local Government by local people 75
5 .4 .3 Union Councillors as mem bers of local com mittees 76
5.5 NGOs – FD /  local people /  Local Government 76
5 .5 .1 NGOs – local people : activities of NGOs in villages 76
5 .5 .2 Involvement of NGOs in field activities of the Forest Department 77
5 .5 .3 Co-operation between the Local Government and NGOs 77
6 ANALYSIS 78
6.1 Territorial Staff of the Forest Department 78
6.2 Territorial Staff – CDEGD Field Staff 80
6.3 Territorial Staff – local people : general relations 81
6.4 Territorial Staff / CDEGD Field Staff – local people: VLUP / JFM 82
6.5 Forest Department – Local Government 84
7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 86
7.1 Evaluation of the decentralization process 86
7.2 Final conclusions 90
7.3 Recommendations 92
7 .3 .1 Territorial Staff of the Forest Department 92
7 .3 .2 Territorial Staff – CDEGD Field Staff 93
7 .3 .3 Territorial Staff – local people (general relations) 94
7 .3 .4 Forest Department – VDCs /WOs 95
7 .3 .5 Forest Department – Local Government 96
Decentrali z ation & Participation in the Forestry Sector of NWFP, Pakistan – The Role of the State
8
1 Introduction
1.1 Research context
The North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) is the northernmost province of Pakistan.
Housing about 40% of the country ’s forest resources, it is the most densely forested
province of the country. However, these forests are in a rather bad condition, and are
expected to be complete ly l iquidated by the year 2025 (Forest V ision 2025, iv).
Reasons for deforestation are manifold, yet some of them without any doubt have a
devastat ing effect on the resource base . On the one hand, forest management as
practised in the N W FP is not susta inable. Forestry is a provinc ia l subject, and the
NWFP Forest Department (FD) is still characterised by its colonial setup from the 19th
century . This means very hierarchica l structures, centra l ized powers and a forest
management , which is ma inly revenue-oriented. On the other hand, there is a
flourishing black market for timber in the province, organized by a so-cal led t imber
ma f i a . Last but not least, mill ions of people l iving in the remote va l leys of the
mountainous province are using forests for their dai ly livel ihoods, as fuelwood and
construction timber for their houses.
Responding to these threats, several donor agencies – the Asian Development Bank
(A D B), the Dutch Government and the Swiss Agency for Deve lopment and
Cooperation (SDC) – initiated a reform process of the provincial Forest Department a
few years ago. Core issues of this reform (which is under ongoing discussion) are a
revision of the lega l framework for forestry as we l l as a re-struc turing and
decentral ization of the department ’s hierarchy. In addition, participatory approaches
(V illage Land Use Planning and Joint Forest Management) have been introduced on
loca l leve l in order to make forestry more loca l ly spec if ic and responding to loca l
people ’s demands. Meanwhile, the major part of the reform has been designed and
discussed in detail, and policies, acts and ordinances as well as job descriptions for the
staff have been adjusted to the new requirements. However, on the planning level (most
of the planning was done in the provincial capital of Peshawar) it is unclear to what
extent necessary steps have been implemented on local and regional level and where
the new approaches face difficulties.
Soon after the reforms got started, a nation-wide political decentralization process was
initiated in late 1999 by President Musharraf . In the course of this process it was
planned to devolve forestry to the local political level. However, the NWFP provincial
government resisted these plans, so that to its major extent, forestry remained with the
provincial level. Relations between the Forest Department and the local political level
thus got very much strained – today it is this conflict which impairs forestry in the
province, too.
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1.2 Hypothesis and research questions
In order to clarify the situation of forestry on local level and the extent to which the
decentra l ization efforts have a lready been implemented into practice, the research
hypothesis was formulated:
O n local level ,  a  b ig  gap e x ists be tween de jure an d de facto forestry .  T here fore ,  the
ongoing reform process cannot be called a true decentrali z ation yet .
In order to formulate research questions, two terms which are used in this hypothesis
have first to be clarified. A definition of what a true decentralization is (especially with
regard to natural resource management (NRM)), must be given. Section 2 gives the
theoretical background on decentralization and NRM and establishes several criterias
which later on serve to test the hypothesis. Second, the local level has to be defined. In
order to reach comprehensibility, the local level has been defined as a cluster of four
major stakeholder groups in forestry: The Territorial Staff of the Forest Department
(‘old’ foresters which sometimes served for more than 30 years in the department); the
recently employed social organizers of the Community Development, Extension and
Gender Development Directorate (CDEGD) of the Forest Department, a new branch in
the department ’s decentralized structure; local people; and the local government. These
four groups, which cannot always be clearly distinguished, are expected to interact in
certain ways, as Figure 1 shows.
This cluster leads to the following research
questions:
•  What part do the Territorial Staf f o f
t h e  F D   i n  t h e  m a n a g e m e n t  o f
natural resources?
•  H ow d o the FD  sta f f  p erce ive  the
o n g o i n g  c h a n g e s  (r e f o r m s)  o n
different hierarchical levels?
•  H o w d o es t h e  l oca l  p o p u la t i o n
p e rce ive  t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  F o res t
Department?
•  H ow d o es t h e  Fo rest  D e p ar t m e n t
i n t e r a c t  w i t h  t h e  L o c a l
Government?
Fig. 1   The ‘ local level’  as defined for
this study, with four major stakeholder
groups (own graphic)
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1.3 Methodology and fieldwork
1.3.1 Selection of the research area
Fieldwork in the NWFP was conducted between October 2002 and February 2003. It
could be combined with a tra ining at the Forest Management Centre Support Unit
(F M C-SU) in Peshawar, a Swiss funded project implemented by Intercooperation,
Swiss Organisation for Development and Cooperation (IC). The fact that this project
was closely interlinked with the reform process of the Forest Department made it more
easy to enter the department ’s structure. Luckily, project and department infrastructure
such as drivers and housing was available for fieldwork, so that several areas could be
examined within the given time.
Four vil lages in two different districts of the N W FP were se lected for research,
considering the following criterias:
•  T o get an e f f icien t insig h t in to part icipa tory act ivi t ies ,  the vil lages had to  be
involved in a Village Land Use Planning (VLUP) and / or a Joint Forest Management
(JFM) process for some months already. O ne half of the villages had to be involved
in JFM, the other half in VLUP.
• In order to identify possible differences, half of the villages had to be located in an
area with Protected Forest ,  respectively in  an area with Reserved and / or Gu z ara
Forest (for the legal classification of forests, see 3 .2 .3).
•  T o cover as m uch re presen ta t ives o f  the Forest  D e part m ent as p ossib le ,  t he
villages had to be located in d if ferent Divisions (ad ministrative unit of the Forest
Department).
Taking into consideration al l these criterias, in Swat D istrict (Protected Forest) the
villages of Bar Lalku (Swat Division, Ma t ta Range; JFM and V LUP) and Dabargai
(K a lam Division, Madyan Range; V L UP) have been se lected; in Hazara D istrict
(mainly Reserved and Guzara Forest), the villages of Shungli (Agror Tanawal Division,
Shergarh Range; V LUP) and Methal (Siran Division, Jabori Range; JFM and V LUP).
In addition, the villages of Che l (Swat, PF , V LUP) and Timri (Hazara, RF , V LUP and
JFM) have been visited in order to attend some committee meetings.
1.3.2 Methodology
Semi-structured interviews were the ma in tool for data collect ion, whereby the
questionnaires mainly served to remind the interviewer of the most important issues to
discuss. The respondents did not read these questionnaires, and the order of questions
often varied, depending on the circumstances. Participative observation was another
tool used, ma inly by part ic ipat ing in monthly meet ings of V il lage Deve lopment
Committees and by joining transect-wa lks with villagers and F D offic ia ls through
forests. Key informants (mainly representatives of FSP in Peshawar) were interviewed
without using structured questionnaires.
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Because the interaction between local people and the Forest Department is mainly a
matter of men, the gender aspect has not fully been taken into consideration. However,
in order to cover the focus group of this study – the departmental staff – female staff
members of the department have been interviewed. They a lso gave most of the
information on the activities and perceptions of Women Organizations. Thus, the
interaction of women and the state with regard to forest-related issues could be a matter
of further investigation.
1.3.3 Fieldwork
Data was collected during two field visits, each lasting about two and a half weeks
(November/December 2002 in Swat; January 2003 in Hazara). Both field visits were
planned on a pilot trip of about two to three days, on which first contacts with Range
Officers (ROs) and Divisional Forest Officers (DFOs) could be established, and some
of the selected villages could be visited for the first time. During the field visits, about
one week time has been a l lotted to each village/range/division in order to conduct
interviews with people in the villages, the Territorial Staff of the department and the
staff of the CDEGD directorate. Additional time was needed for talks with DFOs and
representatives of the Local Government.
Interviews were conducted by following a bottom-up approach. In each division, work
was started with interviews in the villages, followed by talks with Forest Guards and
Foresters and finally an interview with the RO in charge. Only after that, the respective
DFO was consulted to clarify certain issues. CDEGD staff were interviewed whenever
possible. This sequence could be kept in most of the cases.
Where necessary , interviews were conducted with the he lp of interpreters, i .e . in
villages and with Forest Guards, Foresters and Female Forest Extensionists. Due to the
non-availability of a professional interpreter, various people assisted in the interviews.
In some cases, this turned out to be a hindering factor when the interpreter himself was
part of the Forest Department (yet never of the Territorial Staff but of the CDEGD
directorate). In a few cases, higher offic ia ls such as a Range Officer or even a
Divisional Officer insisted on sending along a Forester or Forest Guard for visits to a
village – arguing that it was „a necessary security measure“. This made it very difficult
to conduct effective interviews with people in the villages, and a lot of energy had to be
bestowed on making meaningful interviews possible.
A ll in a l l , about 45 interviews have been conducted in vil lages with members of
different soc ia l groups and with gathered committees; about 20 interviews with
members of the Territoria l Staff of the Forest Department; e ight interviews with
members of the C D E G D directorate; one individual and two group interviews with
Decentrali z ation & Participation in the Forestry Sector of NWFP, Pakistan – The Role of the State
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representat ives of the Loca l Government; f ive interviews with key informants in
Peshawar; plus uncounted informal talks with different people.1
1.4 Existing Research and the geographical context
1.4.1 Present state of research
General l iterature on decentral ized natural resource management (NRM), and forest
management in particular, is available in abundance. Many researchers have joined this
discourse with case studies from al l over the world, so that keeping control of it is
rather difficult. Some of the most interesting contributions dea l ing with factors of
successful decentralized NRM – such as Agrawal/Ostrom (1999) and Manor (2000) –
have been considered for this study and will be discussed more detailed in section 2. In
addition, the latest study by Ribot (2002) has served as a guideline in order to analyse
the situtation in NWFP.
There is a lot of particular research on the forestry sector of NWFP, too. Yet most of
the studies are dea l ing with the technica l aspects of forestry rather than with the
institutional ones. Schickhoff (2002), for instance, gives a superb overview on forest
degradation in the northern part of the province, ana lysing both its ecologica l and
institutional causes. A lthough all major stakeholder groups are represented, the part on
the role of the Forest Department is very much limited to its technical aspects. O ther
researchers such as Clemens/Nüsser (1997) or Jacobsen (1995) give valuable inputs on
aspects such as population growth, ownership pattern or road construction and their
impact on the forests of the Hindukush. On the other hand, Stellrecht (1997) is looking
at the historical development of highland-lowland interaction with regard to forestry,
conc luding that a loss of influence of the highland regions over the ir resources is
causing part of the deforestat ion. Y et none of these studies e laborates the ‘ loca l
realities’ of NWFP forestry.
In that regard, more studies are avai lable for the Indian context. Poffenberger (1996
and 2000) gives a very deta i led ana lysis of the institutiona l settings of the Indian
forestry sector. Due to the fact that both Indian and Pakistani Forest Departments have
been created under British rule (and therefore are still rather similar), Poffenberger’s
research gives a good idea on many structural problems in the NWFP.
The most thorough report on the NWFP forestry sector is given by Ahmed/Mahmood
(1998). The authors give a profound overview on many different stakeholder groups
and present a concise analysis of the forest policy and its current challenges. Yet again,
the Forest Department itself is described in a rather general way. Latest literature on the
                                                      
1 In order to protect respondents, no names will be mentioned in this study, even of those people who
did not mind that. Only those who insisted to be mentioned by name will be identifiable. Where
criticism about the department ’s internal system and working practice has been raised, the area ’s name
will not be given. For the same reasons - and because they were hardly to be checked - personal
accusations among stakeholders are not shown as well.
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institutiona l aspects of forestry in N W FP inc ludes Suleri (2001 and 2002), Ge iser
(2000 and 2003) and Southwold-Llewellyn (2002). Especially Suleri and Southwold-
Llewellyn ask for details in stakeholder relations, so that they will be discussed later on
in this study. For further literature on the NWFP forestry sector, see Schickhoff (2002)
for technical aspects; or Ahmed/Mahmood (1998) for aspects of forest policy.
Most of the abovementioned studies are concluding that institutional reforms within the
Forest Department are highly necessary. However, few researchers only ask for details
of the department ’s structure and too often, the department is ana lysed in a rather
superficial way. Many studies accuse forest officials of corruption but fail to ask for the
causes of such misbehaviour. This study tries to fill this gap, attempting to understand
the institutional details of the Forest Department, and asking how forest officials are
acting under the given local and personal cirumstances. It is hoped that thus, the future
discussion on forestry and its stakeholders will become somewhat more balanced. It is
not the aim of this study to play down the problematic role of forest officials – it is an
attempt to shed light upon a ‘white spot ’ in the research on the NWFP forestry sector.
1.4.2 The geographical context
Forest management is a highly complex issue, shaped by the relations and interactions
between humans and the ir environment. Therefore, it is of spec ia l interest for the
geographica l research which is focussing on such interactions. K ey issues of that
research are the use of resources, the impact of that use on the resource base, and,
l ikewise, the influence of the environment and its dynamics upon humans and their
agency . On the other hand, the same is va l id not only for human-environmenta l
systems but also for interactions within social systems. As mentioned above, this study
concentrates on the agency of different stakeholder groups in the forestry sector,
especially on forest officials in the NWFP. Research thus concentrates on competent
actors in that sector – their actions build a focal point around which the social and
environmenta l interact ions are presupposed as given. The study can therefore be
understood as an analysis of strategic conduct in the sense of Anthony Giddens’ theory
of structuration. G iddens (1988, among others) says that human agency and soc ia l
structure are in a relationship with each other, and it is the repetition of the acts of
individua l agents which reproduces the structure. This means that there is a soc ia l
structure of traditions, institutions, moral principles, and established ways of doing
things; but it also means that these can be changed when people start to ignore them,
replace them, or reproduce them differently. In that sense, this research concentrates on
how people – and forest offic ia ls in particular – reproduce, replace or ignore the ir
social structures with regard to forestry.
1.5 Structure of this study
Section 2 “Decentralization: Theoretical Approaches” gives the theoretical foundations
for decentra l ization, i .e. with regard to natura l resource management. Criterias are
developed which later on are used to test the hypothesis. Section 3 “Forests and their
institutional Environment in the N W FP” informs on the situation of forestry in the
Decentrali z ation & Participation in the Forestry Sector of NWFP, Pakistan – The Role of the State
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North-Western Frontier Province, on possible reasons for deforestation, and gives an
overview on recent and current ini t iat ives in the forestry sector. The current
decentralization efforts in the FD are presented in detail. In a subsequent part, the local
government system, as it presents itse l f three years after President Musharraf ’s
devolution efforts, is described. Section 4 “Selected Stakeholder Groups” describes the
four stakeholder groups, i.e. Territorial Staff, C D E G D staff, local people and local
government individua l ly , espec ia l ly with regard to the ir forest-re lated act ivit ies.
Section 5 “Relations between selected Stakeholders” gives an insight into the forest-
related interactions which have been observed between these four stakeholder groups.
Section 6 “Analysis: Core Problems” identifies the main critical factors and problems
which occur in forestry on loca l leve l . F ina l ly , sec t ion 7 “Conc lusions and
Recommendations” assesses the reform and decentral ization process on local level ,
using the criterias for decentra l ized NRM systems formulated in sect ion 2. In a
subsequent part, recommendations are given which can help to keep the reform process
on track and to make it more efficient.
Decentrali z ation: Theoretical approaches
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2 Decentralization: theoretical
approaches
2.1 Preliminary remarks
This section will establish criterias according to which the current decentralization and
participation efforts in NWFP forestry can be reviewed systematically (section 7). The
idea is to find out where the current FSP approach has its strenghts and weaknesses, not
only to show where certain things do or do not work but also why.
Decentra l ization is a very dominant issue, but it is a lso a complex one. Numerous
authors are currently discussing different approaches and listing criterias, mainly in the
poli t ica l sphere , but a lso wi th regard to natura l resource management (NRM).
However, decentra l ization bears some basica l princ iples which are va l id both for
political systems and NRM . It may anyway be rather difficult to exactly distinguish the
two spheres from each other, espec ia l ly in the situation examined for this study .
Therefore , this sect ion first discusses decentra l izat ion in a rather broad manner,
considering political concerns, too. Subsequently, the focus goes to NRM concerns. As
a result, a list of criterias is formulated, which serves as a guideline for the analysis of
the situation in the NWFP forestry sector.
2.2 Three main types of decentralization
„In all i ts variants, decentrali z ation is about a re-negotiation of the institu tions and social
arrangements through which power is e x ercised in different forms. It is concerned with the
distribution of power , resources, and ad ministrative capacities through dif ferent territorial
units of a government or local groups.“
(Agr awal a nd Ost rom 1999 , 85)
The quest ion of centra l importance for the def init ion of the different forms of
decentralization is: What is being relocated to whom? The following division into three
ma in types of decentra l izat ion is based on Manor (2000), while further types of
decentra l i za t ion given by other authors are l isted be low . But a l though the
decentralization issue can be divided into many sub-topics, one main characteristic that
is crucial for al l different types must not be forgotten: decentral ization must not be
understood as a situation; it is a deve lopment and a process of change from one
institutional system to another (Basta 1999, 29).
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2.2.1 Deconcentration or administrative decentralization
What Functions, responsibilities, com petences
To whom To lower ad ministration (field agencies, local offices)
Agrawal and Ostrom (1999, 76) call deconcentration “the most innocuous of the forms
of decentralization”. This is so because it only includes the transfer of certain functions
and responsibilities, but not the final authority over activities and funds. The transfer
only takes place from higher to lower levels of the same governmental hierarchy, but
not to local institutions external to the state. That is why deconcentration does not
necessari ly need to have the same ef fect as devolut ion (see be low): “ I f this
[deconcentration] happens without strengthening democracy at the same time, it will
strengthen the central power.” (Manor 2000, 4). Deconcentration can also be realized
by creating new field agencies or the dispersal of agents from the centre to lower levels.
A t least, the process requires changes in the forms of excercising power.
2.2.2 Fiscal decentralization
What Decision-making power over funds
To whom To lower ad ministration or non-governmental bodies
Fiscal decentral ization is essential for all forms of decentralization. If the local level
receives decision-making powers to be active on local level, but not the funds required
to implement such activities, decentralization will become void. On the other hand, it
can be rather dangerous to decentra l ize funds only without decentra l izing dec ision
powers on how to use these funds: If the authority over the money is not c learly
defined, misuse of funds may occur. There are different possible ways to finance local
activities, such as taxes or subsidies from the central power (SDC 2001, 6).
2.2.3 Devolution or democratic decentralization
What Responsibility including the final authority, i.e . decision-making power
To whom To lower authorities (governmental and non-governmental)
Unlike deconcentrat ion, devolut ion a lso inc ludes the decentra l izat ion of the f ina l
authority to lower levels. That means that real power is relocated away from a focal
point. Power can be defined as „the capacity to affect the outcome of decision-making
processes. It is important to stress that this implies a genuine role in decision-making,
not just a token input in the form of consultation.“ (F isher 2000, 3). SDC (2001, 6)
defines power in this context as decision making competence, financial competence
and administration.
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It is crucial that power is not only shifted downwards within a given hierarchy (e.g. a
state department), but to independent loca l authorit ies „which are in some way
democratic“ (Manor 2000, 4). These can be legally constituted local governments, but
also democratically elected local committees.
2.2.4 Other types and interpretations of decentralization
Delega tion
Delegation can be seen as a medium form of deconcentration, but with different actors
to whom authori ty is de legated: „ I t refers to transfers of authori ty to public
corporations or special authorities outside the regular bureaucratic structure.“ (Agrawal
and Ostrom 1999, 76). This means that the empowered authorit ies enjoy certa in
independence from the central power.
Economic decent r a liz a tion
This refers to an attempt to deregulate the centra l government ’s control over the
economy , in order to promote strategies for the deve lopment of the private sector,
community participation and partnerships between the private and public sector.
Deregula tion
A decentralization from governments to markets, para-markets and non-governmental
organizations by dismantling price controls, quotas, and barriers to entry. The idea is
“ that market forces determine savings, investment, and consumpt ion dec isions of
economic actors” (Agrawal and Ostrom 1999, 76).
Priva tiz a tion
This denotes „transfers of responsibility for public functions to voluntary organizations
or private enterprises“ (Agrawal and Ostrom 1999, 76).
2.3 Why decentralize?
History shows that most of the decentra l izat ion processes in the past have been
mot ivated by polit ica l reasons. Decentra l izat ion has often been a cruc ia l part of
democratization processes, such as in Latin America and in A frica. In some countries,
such as E thiopia, decentral ization has also been an answer to pressure exercised by
regiona l groups onto the centra l government . A  di f ferent example are the
decentralization processes following the breakdown of the Soviet Union, when, after
the sudden failure of a highly centralized system, an organizational vacuum asked for
new structures. In East Asia, decentra l ization ma inly occurred as an answer to the
central government ’s inability to deliver services to huge populations.
In the development debates, decentralization became important in the 1970s , after it
had been recognised „ that the state was not necessari ly the best agent to pursue
deve lopment as a universa l good, or to dea l wi th the problems of poverty ,
unemployment and inflation“ (Agrawal and Ostrom 1999, 74f).
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The examples of Lat in America and A frica show two ma in reasons for polit ica l
decentral ization: To give more weight to local voices by enabling people ‘s political
par t ic ipa t ion; and to improve the responsiveness of e lected representatives to loca l
demands. Reducing the physical distance between the people and their government
enhances the information exchange and thus makes decision-making processes much
faster. It additionally makes a system more transparent and accountable and thus can
reduce corrupt ion. Following these object ives, decentra l izat ion can be seen as „a
strategy of governance prompted by externa l or domest ic pressures to fac i l itate
transfers of power closer to those who are most affected by the exercise of power“
(Agrawal and Ostrom 1999, 85). The same authors underline that no government will
ever devolve power without getting any benefits in return: „We should expect to see
devolution (…) when some  central political actors or a coalition of such actors finds
that devolution makes it possible to pursue their own goals more effectively.“
The examples of East Asia and the former Soviet Republics show that there can be
strong economica l reasons to decentra l ize systems as we l l . Economists argue that
decentralization gives way to a more economical and efficient redistribution of services
and goods. Furthermore, distributors in a decentra l ized system are c loser to the ir
‚customers ‘ , thus better knowing the ir demands and requests. In return, enhanced
responsiveness makes the ‚customers ‘ more willing to pay for the services they use,
especially if they have been involved in shaping these services.
On the polit ica l leve l , this leads to the argument that decentra l izat ion supports
competition between local governments and thus increases their qual ity. This shows
that political and economical reasons for decentralization often overlap or complement
each other.
2.4 Conditions for success
If decentral ization should work wel l, some essential conditions have to be fulfilled.
Decentralized authorities have to be provided with…
a) … adequ a te funds
As mentioned above, fiscal decentralization is crucial for a successful decentralization
process: „Local governments should have the ability to borrow when they have the
capacity to repay. The legal and regulatory framework can support this message by
specifying the conditions under which local governments may borrow“ (Ford 1999,
13). „Decentralization only works if the officials not only get many tasks and powers,
but also the required funds“ (Basta 1999, 34).
b) … adequ a te powers
The legal and regulatory framework has to enable local authorities to act on a legal
basis and should support an e f fec t ive service de l ivery . Lega l barriers of ten
unappropriate ly restra in the ability of loca l authorities to se lect the most desirable
options for the del ivery of decentral ized services, including private participation and
managed competition (Ford 1999). On the other hand, people should be given the
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power of assoc iat ion as wel l as the right to lobby government agencies. For SD C
(2001, 14), political willingness to devolve power and control is crucial for a successful
decentralization.
However, it is not sufficient to devolve powers without securing them for a certain
period of time. Käl in (1999, 58) states: „Local governments cannot function if their
existence is continuosly threatened by the possibility of higher governmental levels to
dissolve them whenever they want.“ Thus, clear procedures and criterias in the form of
a strong legal framework are necessary to secure the existence of local authorities.
c) … reliable accountability mech a nisms
This inc ludes a transparent e lectoral system (regular elections, local referendums,
permanent public-private councils), a structure of responsibilities as well as a juridical
cadre. Elected authorities have to be accountable towards the local people, whereas the
local administration has to be accountable towards the elected authorities. According to
Fisher (1999, 5), a ma jor prerequisite for ‚meaningful ‘ decentra l ization is to build
levels of trust in local management.
For Ford (1999, 18), a voting democracy itself is not enough if institutionalized ways of
information and mechanisms for local communities to express their preferences do not
exist: „Local government responsiveness – one of the main rationales for decentralizing
– cannot be realized when there are no mechanisms for transferring information.“
Manor (2000, 6) indentifies additional conditions that can help decentralized systems
to work well, but are not essential: a well-established democratic tradition, a free press,
a l ively civil society (including existing participative structures, such as NGOs and
other citizen groups), abundant social capital, a comparatively equitable distribution of
wealth, prior land reform and a high literacy rate.
2.5 Possible impacts of decentralization
If the above mentioned conditions can be fulfil led, democratic decentral ization can
have different, mainly constructive impacts on governance, society and development
(based on Manor 2000, 7f; + means positive impact, o means no impact, – means
negative impact):
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Possible impacts on governance
+ Enhancing transparency   Decisions and decision-making processes become more visible and
intellig ib le to the people at the grass roots. Elected mem bers of local bodies are
better able to ex plain decisions in terms that ordinary people will understand .
+ Increasing responsiveness   The speed , quantity and quality of responses to cit i z ens at the
grass roots can be increased .  Decentrali z ed authorit ies can act without seek ing
ap proval fro m higher au thority ,  thus im proving the e f f iciency of govern m ental
service .
+ Making a government more open    People fro m the local level f ind it easier to gain access
and influence , because elected representatives can be contacted much easier.
+ Improving accountability   The elected me m bers live close to the people that elected the m ,
which sets them under greater pressure than politicans higher up .
– Reduction of quality   If  the sk ills and co m petences on local level are missing ,  and due to
lower tech nical an d ad min istra t ive capacit ies ,  the q uali ty o f  governance m ay
decrease .
Possible impacts on society
+  Increasing participation    Increase d  o p e n n ess ,  r esp o nsive n ess a n d  acco u n ta b i l i ty  o f
decentrali z ed  au thorit ies usually enab les an d insp ires in d ivid uals an d grou ps
with in socie ty to contact e lected representatives m ore o f ten than before .  T his
also enhances the com mitment in im plementation .
+  Strengthening civil society and social capital   Usually ,  the density o f associa t ional t ies
within society increases.
+ Catalysing and moderating social conflicts   Dem ocratic decentralisation tends to m oderate
and civilise social and political conflicts.
+ Breaking down cynicism about government   Govern ments can enhance their legitimacy and
cit i z ens b eco m e m ore wil l in g  to  pay ta x es an d  en gage the mselves in  o ther
constructive ways with the govern m ent .  Kälin  (1 9 9 9 ,  4 9) puts it  l ik e th is: „The
authority of the central govern ment decreases, but the legitimacy of the state is
strengthened . "
– Elite domination   In  h ighly inequitable socie ties ,  decentrali z ed bodies can be captured by
eli tes .  In  such circu mstances ,  t rust  an d  the growth o f  socia l cap ita l are  no t
fostered .
Possible impacts on development
+ Enhancing the impact of local development programmes   Decentrali z ation often supports a
growth of at least partially elected ‚user com mittees‘ in different sectors.
+ Adapting development policies to local conditions   Decentrali z ed authorities are often able
to adapt  schemes devised at higher levels to local conditions and needs.
o Contributing to poverty alleviation   Ex perience shows that de m ocrat ic decen tra li z a t ion
seldom assists in alleviating poverty.
o Promoting economic growth   The e m pirical evidence strongly suggests that the im pact on
growth is largely neutral.
o Mobiliz ing local financial resources   It is unrealistic to e x pect decentrali z ation to assist very
m uch in mobili z ing local financial resources, whereas it is more likely to mobili z e
human resources.
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2.6 Main problems and hindering factors
There are many different ways in which decentra l izat ion and devolut ion can be
misapplied:
Responsibility is often decentralized without accompanying relocation of authority to
make meaningful dec isions required for implementat ion. In other words: Many
processes that are called devolution are in fact not more than a simple deconcentration
(Fisher 2000, 5f). On the other hand, tasks and powers are often devolved without the
funds required for implementation. This is why Käl in (1999, 68) asks for a holistic
decentral ization procedure: „Reforms have to be complete and not only for a certain
branch of the government.“ Ribot (2002, 2) goes into the same direction when saying:
„Transferring power without accountable representation is dangerous. Establishing
accountable representation without powers is empty.“
Responsibi l ity – and somet imes authority – is given to the wrong people or to
inappropriate organisational forms (compare 2.7.2) (Fisher, 2000, 5f).
Approaches to devolut ion and decentra l izat ion are frequent ly based on applying
standard organiza t ional mode ls of local organiza t ion (usua l ly based on forma l
administrative structures) that ignore local conditions, arrangements and organizations.
In other words: The application of decentralization is often sociologically naive (F isher
2000, 5).
A ma in hindering factor espec ia l ly in deve loping countries is the so-ca l led ‚cr is is
effect ’ : Central governments of countries which are continuosly threatened by social
and political conflicts will only slowly devolve decision power to lower levels. (Basta
1999, 36)
Decentralization can also serve a ‚hidden agenda’ of authoritative central governments:
In order to ga in more legitimacy and acceptance among the population as we l l as
among donors or the international community, the aim of empowering the local people
is often neglected.
The question of control is often crucial to decentral ized structures: Local authorities
often have to ask for permission from higher levels before spending money or setting
priorities in their local agendas. A lthough a tough control of local activities is necessary
to prevent malpractices, this control should be of a retroactive character (ex-post) .
(Kälin 1999, 60)
2.7 Decentralization and natural resource management
About 60 countries worldwide are currently undertaking efforts to decentral ize some
aspects of natura l resource management (NRM). A lthough the approaches and the
extent of decentral ization vary in every case, al l involved governments and donors
argue that decentralization would help to increase efficiency and equity in NRM (Ribot
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2002, 3f). However, considering the criterias and possible impacts of decentralization
mentioned before, one has to ask at least whether decentralized NRM systems really
improve the benefits that local communities can get from natural resources. Studies in
different countries have shown that devolution policies often yield only limited benefits
for loca l people, and that in practice there are many hindering factors. Examining
different case studies a l l over the world, Shackleton et a l . (2002, 2) identify some
possible types of benefits from decentralized natural resource management:
Direct benefits Indirect benefits
Access to subsistence and
com mercial products
Share of revenues from sales of tim ber,
NTFPs, or hunting and tourism concessions
Share of incomes from permit and licence
fees
Em ployment
More productive resource base
Infrastructural develop ment
Organisational strengthening
New alliances (e .g . with NGOs)
New channels of com munication with
government
Technical and managerial capacity building
Diversification of livelihoods
Political em powerment
Pride and identity
Experience has shown tha t a successful decentra l iza t ion of na tura l resource
management (NRM) is highly dependent on the role of the central state and on the
forms chosen for local organisations. The latter again points out the question raised in
the beginning of this section: to whom is power devolved? Shackleton et al. (2002, 3)
identify different possible organizational forms, all of them having pro and contras:
District Organizations inclu d ing  local govern m ent organi z at ions such as panchayats in
In d ia  o r  m u l t i-st a k e h o ld e r  d is t r ic t  s t ruct u res a l i g n e d  t o  l i n e
depart m ents .  A lthough well su p ported by a legal fra m ework ,  the
downward accountabilty often varies from modest to very lit tle .
Village Committess facil i ta ted  by govern m ent depart m ents (e .g .  Vil lage D evelop m ent
Co m mittees in  NWFP).  The accountabili ty is very m uch dependent
on the degree of control transferred by the state and on the e x tent
to which local elites capture the process.
Self-initiated
organizations
o p era t in g  o u tsid e  th e  sta te  h ierarchy are  o f te n  acco u n ta b le  to
disadvantaged resource users .  But the lack  of o ff icial sup port and
the a bse nce o f  a  su p p ort ive  le gal f ra m ework  o f te n  l im its the ir
effectiveness and increases the danger of capture by local élites.
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In addition, other critica l factors, both within and between loca l bodies, should be
considered:
Pa r a llel hier a rchies
„A t many sites, parallel hierarchies of traditional leadership, local government and line
department-sponsored committees existed. Often these had unc lear or overlapping
jurisdictions and mandates in NRM that led to institutional conflict and struggles for
power and revenues“ (Shackleton et al. 2002, 4). Looking at the situation in NWFP, the
j irga system2, the FD-initiated V illage Development Committees and the Community
Citizen Boards foreseen in the Local Government Plan 2000 represent such paral lel
hierarchies (see 3.7 for details).
Inhomogenous com munities
It is important to understand that a „community“ is not a homogenous entity with one
common interest. There are rich and poor people, educated and uneducated ones,
people with influence and without. Experience in many different countries has shown
that loca l é l ites often try (and succeed) to dominate NRM committees. Traditiona l
leaders often consider a local committee as a threat to their influence and therefore try
to control it. A participatory approach can further support that, as Williams et al. (2003,
164) point out: „Participatory methods are criticized for producing homogenous ‚ local ’
viewpoints where none previously existed; of privi leging certa in voices whilst
suppressing others (...)“.
Diverging interests a nd methods
The problem of inhomogenous communities is a lso va l id for a l l stakeholders in a
decentral ization process. Communities and the government will hardly ever have the
same interests in decentralized NRM . As Agrawal and Ostrom mention (see 2.3.2 for
citation), a government will never devolve power if it cannot pursue its own goals more
effectively by doing so. This is also reflected in the ways different stakeholders try to
implement decentra l ized NRM: whereas the state often favours forma l genera l ized
resource management rules, local users mostly prefer site-specific norms adaptable to a
changing local context.
2.8 Criterias for assessing decentralization efforts in
NWFP forestry
Based on this brief literature review, a list of criterias can now be established in order
to analyse the situation examined in this study (compare section 5). The idea is to have
a sort of a ’checklist ’ , with which the situation on different levels (Territorial Staff of
the Forest Department, CDEGD staff, local committees etc.) and their relations can be
analysed.
                                                      
2 Jirga is the traditional council of elders in a village, acting as the authority for solving conflicts and
taking important decisions. While in some villages, jirgas still have much influence, official courts or
the police forces increasingly replace them in other places.
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In order to unite most concerns, criterias and critical points mentioned above in one list,
so-ca l led ’recommmendations ’  by Ribot (2002, 3) will be used as a starting point.
Ribot ’s list represents an interesting attempt to analyse NRM decentralization efforts,
reflecting most of the issues discussed in the preceding parts of this section. Most of
these ’recommendations’ are given below, each with a short comment on why and how
they should be applied on the context in the N W FP. Where Ribot does not cover
aspects which seem to be crucial for the situation examined, own criterias have been
added, based on the aspects discussed above. If not indicated otherwise, quotations are
from Ribot (2002, 3).
Criteria 1: Work with local democratic and accountable institutions
„Govern ments, donors, and NG Os can foster local accountability by choosing to work with
an d  b u ild  o n  e lecte d  local g overn m ents where they e x ist ,  (. . .) an d  a p p lyin g  m ult ip le
accountability measures to all institutions making public decisions.”
This is about to whom powers and funds are be ing devolved – it ca l ls for re l iable
accountability measures, ensured by choosing democratic institutions. It helps to check
whether power is devolved to the right people or institutions.
For the situation examined, this criteria mainly covers the relationship between the FD
and the local people, i.e. the V illage Development Committees (V DCs). It has to be
asked whether these committees really represent democratic bodies and whether they
are accountable towards local people. The question will be raised whether or not it
would be better for the FD to cooperate more closely with the Local Government as a
democratic institution.
Criteria 2: Transfer sufficient and appropriate powers and funds
„Govern m e n ts ,  d o n ors ,  N G O s ,  a n d  th e  research  co m m u nity sh o u ld  work  to  d eve lo p
’environ m ental subsid iarity princip les’ to guide the transfer of ap propriate and sufficient
powers to local authorit ies .  Guidelines are also needed to assure an ef fective separation
and balance of executive , legislative , and judiciary powers in the local arena .”
This is about wha t is devolved. Whilst Ribot only points out the importance of
adequate powers, the importance of a fiscal decentralization must not be forgotten. For
the context of this study, the criteria covers (i) whether the Territorial Staff and the
CDEGD Field Staff get the required powers and funds to fulfil their new tasks; (ii)
whether the local committees are sufficiently empowered by the FD . The criteria asks
for a holistic decentralization approach as asked for by Kälin (see 2.4).
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Criteria 3: Transfer powers as secure rights
„To encourage local institu tions and people to invest in new arrange m ents and to enable
local people to be enfranchised as cit i z ens rather than managed as subjects, govern ments
should use secure means to transfer powers to local authorities. Secure transfers can create
the space for local people to engage their representatives as cit i z ens.  Transfers made as
privileges subject local people to the whims of the allocating agencies and authorities.”
This criteria covers how power is devolved. It has to be checked whether the powers
and funds devolved under the FSP approach are secure or not , both for the
intergovernmenta l processes and the co-operat ion with loca l committees. Are the
Territorial Staff motivated to use their new competences in a long-term perspective or
do the higher levels of the department keep the option to intervene whenever they feel
appropriate to do so? Are the new possibilities of local people in NRM only temporary
privileges which completely depend on the FD ’s goodwill, or are they secure powers,
backed by enforceable laws and regulations?
Criteria 4: Support equity and justice and establish fair and accessible adjudication
„Central govern ment in tervention may be needed for redressing inequities and preventing
elite capture of public decision-making processes. Central govern ment also m ust establish
the enabling legal environ ment for organi z ing , representation , rights, and recourse so that
local people can demand govern ment responsibility, equity, and justice for themselves. (. . .)
Govern ments should establish accessible independent courts, channels of appeal outside of
the g overn m ent agencies involve d  in  na tural resource m anage m ent ,  an d  local d isp u te
reso lu t io n  m ech a n isms .  D o n ors a n d  N G O s ca n  a lso  su p p ort  a l t e rn a t ive  a d ju d ica t io n
mechanisms to supplement official channels instead of replacing them .”
On the one hand, this points out the crucial role of the centre, in this case the (upper
levels of the) Forest Department. The centre is asked to intervene in the process in an
‚ex-post ’ (Kälin) manner in order to protect the rights of minorities and to ensure the
rules and laws. This criteria covers both the intergovernmental processes (can equity
within the department be guaranteed?) and the relations with local communities (can an
élite ’s capture of local committees be prevented?).
On the other hand, it asks for the involvement of third parties which can mediate in the
case of dissatisfaction of one party. In relation to NRM for instance, NGOs could act as
independent body and mediator in case of conflict. It has thus to be asked whether the
examined decentralization approach allows third parties.
Decentrali z ation & Participation in the Forestry Sector of NWFP, Pakistan – The Role of the State
26
Criteria 5: Establish minimum environmental standards
„Govern m ents should  sh if t  f ro m a m anage m ent-plan nin g to  a  m in im u m-environ m ental
s t a n d a r ds a p p ro ach .  Bro a d  m in i m u m  st a n d a r ds ca n  f aci l i t a t e  eco lo g ica l ly  so u n d
independent local decision making . (...) There is no need to e x pect that local authorities will
not convert natural wealth into financial wealth , especially where cash is in short supply and
is viewed as more valuable than standing forest .“
It would be naive to expect that local people would use the powers devolved to them
for completely sustainable forest management only. In order  to avoid both the local
leve l from act ing arbitrari ly and the centre from excerc ising too much control ,
minimum standards are therefore required.  They assure that a guideline is given for
local activities and define a clear limit beyond which a central authority can interfere (if
the standards are not obeyed). This study will ask whether the V LUP/JFM guidelines
provide any minimum standards, according to which both parties – local committees as
well as the FD – have to work, and which define clear rules according to which the FD
could intervene in the process (for the case standards are not met).
Criteria 6: Support education and information
„Govern ments, donors, and NG Os can inform people of their rights, write laws in clear and
accessib le language ,  and translate legal te x ts in to local languages to encourage popular
engage m ent and local govern m ent responsib ili ty .  When there are m eaningful rights it  is
cr i t ica l  f o r  p e o p le  t o  k n o w t h e m .  Ed uca t in g  loca l  a u t h or i t i es o f  t h e ir  r i g h ts a n d
responsibilities can also foster responsible local governance .”
It has to be asked whether the Forest Department undertakes enough to inform its own
Territoria l Staff about the new tasks, rights and powers coming with the current
reforms and whether local committees are sufficiently informed about their own rights
and obligations, and those of the department towards them.
Criteria 7: Organi z ational models should be locally specific
„For the future it is crucial to develop systems which are able to move . In this sense , built-in
fle x ibility will rather lead to sustainable structures than a bold plan .“
(Bennett 1994 , 11 , cit . in: Basta  1999 , 40)
On the inter-governmental level, it has to be asked whether the staff implementing the
reforms in the f ie ld have enough freedom to act f lexibly and according to loca l
requirements; wi th regard to the re lat ionship between the department and the
communities, the question whether or not the V illage Land Use Planning approach
considers local circumstances and allows local solutions to local problems, has to be
raised.
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3 Forests and their institutional
environment in the NWFP
This section gives a basic overview on forests in the NWFP, the current ecological
situation and the legal status of forests in the province. Possible causes of deforestation
are discussed, with a focus upon past and current initiatives in the province ’s forestry
sector. For this, the two approaches of V illage Land Use Planning (practised by the
Forestry Sector Project) and Joint Forest Management (pract ised by the Forest
Management Centre) are introduced. In order to give a basic understanding of the
situation examined in subsequent sections, the political setup in the province will be
presented as well.
3.1 NWFP : area and main characteristics
Area a nd Loca tion
Covering an area of 10.17 Mio. ha, the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) is the
smal lest province of Pakistan.  Located in the mountainous north of the country, its
borders go with A fghanistan in the West, Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab in the East
and South, Balochistan in the far South and the Federally administered Northern Areas
in the North.
Administ r a tive Setup
The province, which was administratively set up in 1901 under British rule, is divided
into seven divisions which aga in consist of tota l 22 districts. These are: H aza r a
Division (Districts: Abbottabad, Mansehra, Kohistan, Haripur), Malakand Division
(Malakand, Swat, Dir, Chitral), Mardan Division (Swabi, Mardan); Peshawar Division
(Peshawar, Charsadda, Nowshera); Kohat (Kohat, Karak); Bannu; Dera Ismail Khan.
Besides these units, 25’679 km2 of the province are so-ca l led F A T A ’s – Federa l ly
Administered Tribal Areas – where neither the provincial nor the national government
have much influence and which are represented towards the state each by a political
agent.3
Physica l Ch a r acter istics
The NWFP is mainly characterised by high mountains and uncountable valleys. From
the plains around the provincial capital of Peshawar at 340 metres above sea level, the
terrain reaches 7’750 metres on its highest peak, Tirich Mir in the North-West. While
the western and southwestern ranges along the border with A fghanistan are subject to
very dry climatical conditions with only scarce vegetation, the northern mountains of
the outer and middle H ima layas and the H indukush be long to the sub-tropica l
continental highlands with snowy winters, cool summers, and winter and spring rains.
(Kureshy1997, 56)
                                                      
3 GoP (2003). http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/pco/statistics/demographic_indicators98/demographic_
indicators.html. Date of retrieval 3/6/2003.
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Popula tion
In 1998, 17,7 million people were living in the NWFP. Population is growing very fast
in the province: since the 1950s, population nearly quadrupled. Today, the NWFP has
an annual growth rate of 2,82% a year, which is the highest rate all over Pakistan. More
than 83% of these people are l iving in rural areas with a population density of 238
people/km2 (which is the second-highest in Pakistan, after Punjab province). The
average household size is eight people, a number which is clearly above the national
average. With 35,4%, the literacy rate lies far below the national average, wherby only
18,8% of women are l iterate (men: 51,4%).4 Pashto is the most common language
spoken in NWFP (68%), followed by Hindko (18%), while many people also speak
Urdu, which is the national language of Pakistan. In 1981, 99.5% of the population
were Muslims. (Khan 1991, 94f)
3.2 Forests in the NWFP
3.2.1 Forest cover and tree species
Due to climatical conditions, most of the forests of the province can be found in the
valleys of Hazara and Malakand Division. According to the Forest Sector Master Plan
1993, 17% of the province ’s area are covered by forests (Pakistan: 4.8%), while
agricultura l land covers 15% (Pakistan: 23%). The exact landuse figures are given
below in Figure 2. However, these figures are subject to ongoing debates over the area
under real forest cover. On the one hand, out of the 1.684 Mio. ha forest cover in the
province, 202’000 ha are farmland trees. On the other hand, other statistics of the
Forest Department (FD) define all the areas which are under the administrative control
of the F D as forests, a lthough on many of these areas not one tree can be found
anymore (Suleri 2001, 5). Thus, the datas reported by the FSMP and PFRI (compare
3.4.1 for deta i ls) differ wide ly , because different statistics are based on different
methods. Unlike the figures given be low , the Asian Deve lopment Bank c la ims an
actual countrywide forest cover of 3,2% only (Suleri 2002, 4).
Pakistan NWFP
Area (Mio . ha) % Area (Mio . ha) %
Forest /  Trees 4 .244 4 .8 1 .684 17 .0
Agriculture 20 .580 23 .0 1 .546 15 .0
Range Lands 28 .507 32 .0 4 .894 48 .0
Barren Lands 26 .893 31 .0 0 .138 1 .0
Water Bodies 0 .913 1 .0 0 .064 0 .9
Urban 0 .138 0 .2 0 .004 0 .1
Unclassified 6 .725 8 .0 1 .844 18 .0
Total 87 .980 100 10 .174 100
Fig. 2   Land use situation in Pakistan and the NWFP in particular (Forest Vision 2025 , 2)
                                                      
4 GoP (2003). www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/pco/index.html. Date of retrieval 8/6/2003.
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In the hil ly regions of the province, ma in coniferous spec ies are Deodar (C edrus
deodara), B lue Pine (Pinus wall ichinia), Chir pine (Pinus roxburgi t), F ir (Abi es
pindrow), Kail (Pinus excelsa) and Spruce (Pinea smithiana). Among the broad-leaved
trees, Walnut (Juglans regia) is the most common one. (Forest V ision 2025, 2)
3.2.2 Legal categories of forests
Forests in the NWFP are divided into different legal categories which are based on
ownership patterns, rights and management responsibilities.
Reserved Forest (RF)
6% of NWFP forests are in this category. Mainly located in the Hazara Division, these
forests are exclusive property of the state. Local people have very limited rights only,
such as right of way, collection of fuelwood and permission to let their animals graze.
Clearing land or cutting trees is forbidden, even if for local use only. Reserved Forests
have been demarcated in the settlement of 1872 and 1905.
Protected Forest (PF)
30% of NWFP forests are in this category. Originally inherited from the princely states
of Chitral, Dir and Swat, these forests can mainly be found in the districts of Chitral,
Dir, Swat, Buner, Shangla and in Kohistan on the west side of the Indus.  A lthough
declared as State property, local people have a few rights, such as share in timber sales
proceeds for loca l right holders from areas which are harvested according to a
management plan of the FD (so-cal led ‘royalties ’ ; 60% share in Malakand Division,
80% share in Hazara Division). Use of timber for local purpose is al lowed with the
permission of the F D . Additiona l ly , collecting fue lwood and grazing of anima ls is
permitted.
Guz a r a  Forest (GF)
33% of N W FP forests are in this category. Guzara forests are privately owned but
managed by the FD . Only owners and right-holders in these forests can cut timber with
the permission of the FD , others do not have the right to apply for a permit (but can ask
the owner to apply for them). Dry wood can be collected by everyone, as long as the
owners or right-holders do not have any objections; the same is va l id for grazing.
Guzara forests can be found in Hazara Division, but not in Malakand.
The remaining 31% of NWFP forests consist of plantations and trees on farmlands as
well as communal and private forests – categories which do not play an important part
in this study. Later on, section 4 will show that the de jure situation described here does
not represent the de facto situation. Illicit cutting by various stakeholders is widespread
throughout the province and in all types of forests.
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3.2.3 Important forest stakeholders
Those stakeholder groups which are relevant for this study will be described more
detailed in section 4. Here, only a general overview will be given. A complete listing of
forest stakeholders is given by Ahmed and Mahmood (1998, 21).
Residents
In relation to forests, local people can be divided into three main categories: Guzara
forest owners, rightholders, and non-right-holding forest users. A ll of them mainly use
forests for collecting fuelwood, cutting timber for house construction, grazing animals,
and collecting non-timber forest products.
Guja rs (nom ads)
Seasona l migrants which pay a certa in fee (qalang) to local land-owners or forest
rightholders in order to let their animals graze. Thus, they mainly depend on the forest
for grazing and collecting fuelwood.
Provinci a l Government /  Forest Depa r tment (FD)
Forestry is a provinc ia l subject in Pakistan, and forests are an important source of
income for the respective government. Thus, the provinc ia l department “ is under
pressure to increase the flow of revenues to the exchequer, sometimes compromising
its role to susta inably manage the forests.” (Suleri 2001, 8). The department sti l l
reproduces colonia l structures from the 19th century , be ing organized in a stric lty
hierarchica l way . Forest Guards, Foresters and  Range O ff icers represent the
department on local level.
Feder a l Government
Although forestry is in the hands of the provinces, it was the government in Islamabad,
represented by the Inspector General of the Forests, which in 1993 imposed the ban on
commercial timber harvesting (see 3.2.4).
Timber cont r actors
Usually, the felling, conversion and transportation of trees is not done by the FD itself.
Since 1977, this is in the hands of the so-ca l led Forest Deve lopment Corporation
(F D C), an institution externa l to the F D hiring professiona ls on contract-basis for
harvesting particular areas. De facto bound to working plans issued by the Forest
Department, these contractors often tend to cut more than required in order to increase
their profit. The ban on timber harvesting has seriously hampered their business.
‘Timber Ma fia ’
Because profits in the Pakistani timber business are very attractive (due to shortage in
domestic supply and import restrictions), a whole cluster of local élites such as wealthy
villagers, loca l politicans, rich outsiders and representatives of the F D are active ly
involved in il legal timber business. Local residents are often hired for logging and
transportation – what makes it very difficult for officials to get hold of the wire-pullers.
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Non-governmenta l O rga niz a tions (NGOs)
There are numerous environmental NGOs in the NWFP. Two of the most important
ones dealing with forestry are Sungi and SA F I. The Sungi Development Foundation has
been established in 1989. Sungi (which means ‘partner’ in the local Hindko dialect)
works on issues of policy advocacy and community development. With presently 70
staff members, it operates in four districts of Hazara in Haripur, Abbottabad, Mansehra
and Battagram, covering more than 100 communities and over 150 community-based
organizations. In 1997, Sungi helped to establish the Sarhad Awami Forestry Ittehad
(SA F I), an alliance of various forest stakeholders which are challenging the state forest
reform process. The common aim is to protect the forests and people ’s forest rights. By
1999, SA F I had a membership of approximately 3000 forest dwellers, organized with
committees at provincial, divisional, and district level (Geiser 2000, 13).
Intern a tion a l Donor Agencies
Several international donors support the forestry sector reforms in the NWFP. Among
them are the Swiss and the Dutch government (the latter cancelling its support in early
2003) and the Asian Development Bank (A DB), which jointly established the Forestry
Donor Coordinat ion Group, a forum for discussing forestry-related issues with the
government.
O ther important stakeholder groups are international NG Os or the wood-processing
industry.
3.2.4 Demand, supply and pressure
It is important to distinguish between local demand by people living in the respective
areas and market demands. Some experts believe that the local demand is small enough
so that the provincial forests could be managed in a sustainable way. (For average
figures on local timber consumption, see 4.3.3). However, with an ongoing population
increase in the province, the local demand is growing day by day.5 Poffenberger (2000,
72) notes: “The environmental consequences of rapid population growth are direct and
visible, inc luding the denudation of forested hillsides, increased demand for forest
products and fuelwood (…)”.
The market demand in the country is estimated around 2.3 Mio m3 (Forest V ision 2025,
4). Together with high timber prices (partly due to a restrictive import policy, it is twice
the global average) one can understand that timber smuggling is a flourishing business.
Even after the Federa l Government, under the impression of devastating floods in
September 1992, imposed a total ban on commercial timber harvesting, illicit cutting
for sale did not stop. Neverthelss, the ban is still in place today, and has been lifted for
a short time in 2001 only. Many experts even believe that timber smuggling increased
since the ban had been imposed: “Ironically, the ban aggravated the problem of illegal
cutting. One reason for this was discontinuation of demarcations and work-plans by the
                                                      
5 Compare Balzer 2002.
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Forest Department , in effect , making the ban a carte blanche for unregulated
harvest ing.” (Suleri 2002, 3). The ‘ t imber maf ia ’  plays a cruc ia l part in that .
Surprisingly, in 1992 the Provincial Forest Resource Inventory (PFRI) concluded that
the actual pressure on forests was for the purpose of fuelwood (88%) and not for timber
(12%). Supposedly, il legal cutting had not been considered for the study, and many
experts doubt these figures. Yet it is clear that the ban could not prevent the demand
from remaining too high, and that (informal) wood supply continues to be everything
e lse but susta inable . Thus, PFRI a lso reported that “unless spec ia l measures are
undertaken, it is apprehended that the major part of the [accessible] present natural
forests would have been liquidated in the next 25 years.” (Forest V ision 2025, iv)
3.3 Past initiatives in NWFP forestry
As a matter of fact, the findings of the PFRI were not very new. Several initiatives
taken by the Forest Department itself and other organizations attempted to tackle the
problem of deforestation in NWFP in the 1970s already. Major initiatives started in the
1980s:
Kala m Interg r a ted Development Project (KIDP)
The Swiss-supported project was init iated in 1981 and came to an end in 1998.
Focussing on the Ka lam and Bahra in Tehsi ls in Upper Swat (Ma lakand Division),
KIDP formed numerous Community Based Organizations (CBOs) in order to enable
the vi l lagers to he lp themse lves for communi ty deve lopment . Ma jor act iv i t ies
concerning forests were the development of a new harvesting system, the establishment
of loca l timber checkposts and afforestation in Protected Forests. “K IDP gave the
communities a sense of ownership in natural resource management and a confidence
that collaborative approach works” (Suleri 2001, 12).
Soci a l Forest ry Project Mala k a nd a nd Dir  (SFPMD)
The Dutch-assisted project operated from 1987 to 1997, pioneering social organization
and capacity building of local communities with the introduction of the Village Land
Use P lanning approach (V L UP). A l though the project concentrated on forest
rightholders only , it succeeded in familiarizing the Forest Department with the
partic ipatory V L UP approach, which later on was inherited by the Forestry Sector
Project (FSP) and initiated the establishment of a Social Forestry Section in the FD .
Si r a n Forest Development Project (SFDP)
It was this German-supported project, which from 1992 onwards for the first time
introduced the idea of Joint Forest Management Committees (JFMCs) in Pakistan. The
challenge was to bring together in one committee local people and FD officials in order
to share powers and responsibilities in local forest management. SFDP also succeeded
to initiate a change in the legal framework when the principles of JFM were fixed in the
Hazara Protected Forest Rules 1996. The JFMC in Methal, Hazara, which is examined
in this study, was originally initiated by SFDP. The project finally closed down in the
late 1990s, due to resistance and non-compliance by the provincial government.
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3.4 Recent and current initiatives
3.4.1 Recent initiatives in planning and legislation
Forest ry Sector  Master  Pla n (FSMP)
Before the floods in September 1992, the Government of Pakistan together with A DB
and UNDP prepared a 25-years master plan in order to give a national perspective of
the forest sector and its future priorities. These were: doubling tree cover in area terms
and quadrupling (!) wood production unti l 2018 by intensif ied management (and a
doubling of the FD ’s staff); better protection and rehabilitation of public forest as well
as an improvement in landuse. Ahmed and Mahmood (1998, 94) term the FSMP as
“extremely ambitious” and being “likely never to be funded”.
Provinci a l Forest Resource Inventory (PFRI)
After the floods, officials came to the conclusion that a lack of well-stocked forests in
the hi l ls had caused the catastrophe and imposed a ban on commerc ia l t imber
harvesting (in the beginning it was planned to lift the ban after two years). Under this
impression and with the assistance of the German GTZ , an in-depth study about the
state of forests in NWFP was started in order to establish a scientific data base and to
identify further activities. The resulting PFRI for the first time pointed out the alarming
gap between supply and demand and predicted the extinction of forests within the next
25 years.
H a z a r a  Protected Forest Rules 1996
Until recently, forest policies in Pakistan were completely tied to their colonial past.
Apart from minor changes, the Forest Act 1927 was never adapted until today. In 1996
only, the SFDP (see 3.3.1 for detai ls) succeeded to modify the Act with the Hazara
Protected Forest Rules, fixing a mandate and guidelines for Joint Forest Management
in the province.
3.4.2 Current reform of the legal framework
Revising and modernizing the legal framework for provincial forestry has been one of
the main tasks of the Forestry Sector Project (FSP; see 3.5 for details):
Forest Policy 2001
Wi th the N W FP Forest Policy 2001, the new part ic ipatory approach in forest
management f ina l ly got a lega l ized status. Part ic ipat ion of loca l communi t ies,
promotion of private sector investment, and recommendations for the revision of the
forestry legislation are included. Illegal harvesting and the local need for fuelwood and
construction timber are recognized as core problems. The policy for the first time not
only addresses stocked areas, but a lso the management of range lands, waste lands,
watersheds and farm forestry. In this regard, the document can be seen as a trendsetter
in Asia. (Suleri 2001, 14)
Nevertheless, the ‚Sarhad Awami Forest Ittehad‘ (SA FI) critizised the new policy as a
completely donor-driven document, being not more than a lip-service that would not
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lead to a true change in the Forest Department ’s attitude towards local people. The
Forestry Donor Co-ordination Group (2000, 19) stated: „Though the rights of resource
users and right-holders and other forms of participation are mentioned in other parts of
the policy document, it is not made clear what the implications are for the role [of the
FD].“
NWFP Forest O rdin a nce 2002
The Ordinance, which has been promulgated on June 10, 2002, defines the institutional
details for forestry in the province, following the guidelines given by the Forest Policy
2001. The Territoria l Staff of the F D is dec lared as a ‘ force ’  and can now carry
weapons on duty for self-defence, although only Range Officers are allowed to open
fire. It is therefore expected that in future, the number of legal cases against forest
officials will decrease. The document was warmly welcomed by the Territorial Staff
for giving them more power in dealing with offenders. Interestingly, the Ordinance also
provides a legal cover for the participatory approaches V illage Land Use Planning and
Joint Forest Management, and describes the staff ’s involvement in the work with local
communities. For many observers, this is a serious contradiction that will result in a
status quo of the present situation. This problem will also be addressed in this study.
The Ordinance replaces the former Forest Act 1927 – yet due to constitutional reasons,
it had to be promulgated as an Ordinance. In its draft stage already, it was critizised
from various part ies for not sat isfying in many ways, espec ia l ly cement ing the
important role of the Forest Department. The Forestry Donor Co-ordination Group
(2000, 18) stated: „The Forest Act in its present draft is not prescribing the new roles
and tasks [for the FD] that are resulting from the policy focus on participation of the
civil society in natural resource management. Hence, there is a central discrepancy
between the forest policy document and the forest law in this most important aspect of
the whole sector reform.” Several civil society organizations unanimously rejected the
Ordinance and held public protests against it. SA FI even announced to observe June 10
as a ‘black day’ .
3.5 Institutional reforms: the NWFP Forestry Sector
Project (FSP)
3.5.1 Principles and objectives
In 1996, the Forestry Sector Project (FSP) was started under a loan agreement between
the Asian Development Bank (A DB) and the Government of Pakistan (GoP), while the
Dutch Government was financ ing the technica l assistance components. The project
should continue the various initiatives from the 1980s and 1990s (compare 3.3.1), by
institutionalizing a participative approach for sustainable natural resource management
within the FD that could be applied throughout the province. Besides implementing
legal reforms (compare 3.4.2) and other tasks, FSP has mainly been working on the
enhancement of the department ’s institutional capacity by following these principles
and objectives (Heering 2002):
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FSP principles
•  Institutionali z ation of the participatory forestry approach in the working of the department
•  Social organi z ation and capacity building of local com munities’ organi z ations
•  Creation of speciali z ed units in im portant areas
•  Increasing coordination and co-operation and promotion of team-based management in the
department
•  Decentrali z ation of planning and authority
•  Re-definition and re-orientation of the role of the FD towards advisory functions
•  Addressing gender concerns in the department
•  Im proving the training and education system of the department
3.5.2 Reorganization of the department
In order to increase coordination and co-operation within the F D , to decentra l ize
planning and authority and to enable the department to implement the new participatory
approach, a new ‘matrix-structure ’  for the department has been deve loped. Ma in
characteristic of this structure is that the territorial units (Forest Guards, Foresters,
Range Officers etc.) are now supplemented by four specialized directorates: Planning
and Monitoring (P& M)6; Human Resource Management (HRM); Research and
Deve lopment (R & D) and Communi ty Deve lopment , E x tens ion and Gender
Development (CDEGD).
One the one hand, the matrix should a l low a devolut ion of power wi thin the
department, following the principle of subsidiarity (decisions should be taken on the
lowest leve l possible). Each representat ive of the terri toria l uni t should get a
counterpart on the same level in every directorate in order to strengthen the horizontal
links within the department and to make the organizational structure less hierarchical.
On the other hand, horizontal links should enable the FD to build teams on field level
in order to work with the communities in an integrative manner for V illage Land Use
Planning (see section 5).
                                                      
6 It was foreseen to change the existing Forest Management Centre (FMC) into this new directorate.
However, at the time of research this has not happened.
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Fig. 3  The new matrix  structure of the Forest Department (own graphic, based on: GoNWFP,
Presentation on the Devolution and Re-Organi z ation Plan 2000 , 22)
Last but not least, the task of Farm Forestry has been devolved to the district level and
is now under the control of the District Government. This measure included devolving
staff, too, and allowed the FD to downsize its own staff. However, this ‘devolution’ has
often been critizised, as it is widely known that Farm Forestry is not a key issue, so that
the impression could be ga ined that the F D was glad ‘ to ged rid of ’ that task (an
impression, by the way, which has been given not only by local politicians but also by
representatives of the FD) (compare 4.4.3).
3.5.3 Village Land Use Planning (VLUP)
A key tool for the interaction between the Forest Department and loca l people is
V illage Land Use Planning (V LUP), an approach which has been introduced in the
province by the Social Forestry Project Malakand and Dir in the early 1990s (compare
3.3 for details). In order to understand the V LUP approach, it is crucial to know first
the new managerial approach of the Forest Department:
“In order to ensure participation of co m m unities according to social forestry princip les in
t h e  p la n n in g  a n d  i m p le m e n t a t io n  p rocess ,  NWFP is  d iv i d e d  i n t o  t h re e  Reso u rce
Manage m ent C ircles (RMC) an d  2 9  Resource Manage m ent Units (RMUs),  which are the
strategic planning units for NRM (…) RMUs have further been sub-divided into 118 Resource
Manage m ent Sub-Units (RMSs),  covering about 5 ,0 0 0 villages ,  ou t o f which about 3 ,0 0 0
may be considered suitable for significant NRM interventions.  RMSs serve as planning units
for which operation p lans (OPs) are prepared under the broad guidelines of the strategic
plans of RMUs.  OPs provide the financial and organi z ational basis for undertak ing village
land use p lans (VLUP) in  selected villages within the RMS,  while VLUPs serve as a tool for
p a r t ic i p a t o ry  p la n n in g  a n d  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  v i l l a g e  co m m u n i ty  a n d  NRM
in terven t ions .   OPs are prepared for each vil lage usin g the m etho d ology develo ped in
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SFPMD i.e . , through village develop ment co m mittees (VD Cs), which are established during
the VLUP process.”
 (FSP revised PC-1 , 2001 , cit . Suler i 2001 , 14f)
In other words, V illage Land Use Planning should add the participatory element to
forestry in the NWFP, by devolving certain decisions and powers to the village level.
The methodology for V LUP is as follows: A fter a village has been selected by the FD ,
a small team consisting of representatives of the Territorial Staff and the CDEGD field
staff inform the villagers in a large meeting about the objectives and opportunities of
the approach. If the vil lagers agree to cooperate, they can e lect two committees, a
V illage Development Committee (V DC) for men, and a Women Organization (WO)
for women. A  democrat ic e lectora l process should ensure that these committees
represent all sections of a community. A t the same time, data collection in the village
begins jointly by FD staff and local people in order to identify major problems and
potentials in the village. In several subsequent meetings, FD staff and the V DC/WO
(separate meetings with female FD staff for the WO) develop a V illage Land Use Plan
which has to be presented to the whole community for approva l . Besides basic
information on the respective village, the plan provides the objectives agreed upon, the
planned intervent ions, expected outcomes and the ways of implementat ion and
monitoring. Some interventions can already start before the plan has been finalized, e.g.
nurseries and plantat ions controlled by loca l people , tra inings on bee-keeping or
traditiona l birth assistance for women. Forma l co-operation starts when an offic ia l
agreement for the duration of five years between the FD and the V DC/WO has been
signed.
Thus, V i l lage Land Use Planning concentra tes on communi ty infrastruc ture
interventions and NRM activities such as nurseries and plantations. Changes in the
management of designated forests (such as Protected or Reserved Forests) are not
foreseen.
3.5.4 Current situation
While FSP was fully working at the time of research, the situation changed drastically
only a few weeks later. By the end of April 2003, the Dutch government decided to
stop the grant given to FSP, arguing that the performance of D H V – the Dutch
consultancy company in charge – was not sat i fying. Thus, the whole technica l
assistance component of FSP got suspended, with immediate effect on loca l and
international staff. A fter a phase of uncertainity about the continuation with another
consultancy company, it was finally decided in June 2003 to pull out for good. Thus,
only the A DB loan is granted (situation July 2003). V LUP has been continued in the
field, even though most of the FSP offices in Peshawar have been closed down.
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3.6 Joint Forest Management (JFM)
3.6.1 Joint Forest Management in the NWFP
Joint Forest Management foresees the involvement of local people in the management
of designated forests. It was the German-funded Siran Forest Deve lopment Project
which for the first time introduced JFM in the province (see 3.3). Two examples were
started on a trial basis, one in Siran Forest Division, the other in Agror Tanawal Forest
Division (both located in Hazara). When the SFDP closed down, both trials stopped for
several years until the Swiss-funded Forest Management Centre Support Unit (FMC-
SU) again started to implement JFM on a trial basis and continued to work with the
same villages. Today, one of these villages is again actively involved in JFM7, while
additional trials have been started in other divisions.8
3.6.2 The JFM approach and its experiences
With more or less the same methodologies as used by the V LUP approach, JFM seeks
to involve local people in the management of designated forests (Protected, Reserved
and Guzara Forests). “JF M is a form of Collaborative Forest Management where
products, responsibil it ies, control and dec ision making authority is shared joint ly
between local users and the forest authority.” (Khattak 2001, 3) The procedure in a
village is quite similar to V LUP: after a village has been selected for JFM , local people
are informed jointly by representatives of the FD Territorial Staff and FMC . If they
agree to cooperate, forest areas, owners and users are identified, before a Joint Forest
Management Committee (JFMC) is elected on democratic principles by the villagers.
Only then, the preparation of a JFM Plan begins, while some first minor interventions
can already start. A fter approval of the plan by the government, the JFMC and the FD
sign an agreement for the implementation of the plan.
As the first initiatives for JFM date back to the early 1990s, the approach draws on
some experience in the province, inc luding a few success stories, such as a better
permit procedure for construct ion t imber in Me tha l  (see 5.1.2 for deta i ls). O ther
advantages can be a more effective protection of forests from ill ic it cutting and a
mutual control of local people and the FD Territorial Staff. In addition, the workload of
the latter can decrease a lot. Experience has shown that the rea l ization of JF M in
Protected Forests is much more difficult than in Reserved Forests, as the structure of
users and rightholders in PFs is much more complicated (see also 5.1).
                                                      
7 Me thal , which was examined for this study. JFM in F a thebandi has been stopped due to various
reasons.
8 E .g. Bar Lalku in Malakand Division, a village that was examined for this study.
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3.6.3 Integration of JFM and VLUP
Considering that JFM and V LUP are based on the same principles, foreign advisers of
FMC and FSP came to the conclusion that the two approaches should be merged. The
only differences are with regard to the scope of the approach (JFM: designated forest
area; V L UP: village area) and the degree of involvement of the F D in mangement
(greater role in JMF than in V LUP) (Werter 2002, 4). Thus it was decided in 2002 that
in future, a joint V LUP/JFM approach would be followed. It is foreseen that in each
selected village, both a V LUP Committee and a JFM Committee are established, while
the process of information of villagers and data collection has to be done once only.
The idea of a joint approach led to many misunderstandings both within the FMC and
the FSP and was a matter of long and emotional discussions until early 2003. The fact
that many in the F D did not agree to inc lude loca l people in the management of
designated forests (and thus rejected the idea of JFM) caused much delay. A t the time
of research, implementation of the joint approach was only in its very beginning.
3.7 Local Government
3.7.1 Background
A fter se izing power in Pakistan, Genera l Pervez Musharraf on October 17, 1999
presented seven ‘ma in objectives ’  for his presidency . One of these objectives was
ca l led ‘devolut ion of power to the grassroots leve l ’ , which should strengthen
democracy nation-wide on the three leve ls state, province, and district. In order to
follow a bottom-up approach, reforms were started on the lowest level. A National
Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) was formed as a ‘ think tank’ . In March 2000, the NRB
presented the ‘ Loca l Government Plan 2000’ , a new framework for government
structures on district and sub-district level. Local elections were announced for the
same year and started in December 2000. The next year, the Loca l Government
Ordinance 2001 was final ized so that on August 14, 2001 (Pakistan’s Independence
Day), all new Local Governments could take office.
3.7.2 Principles and structure
Principles a nd T a rgets
The reforms followed three basic principles which are: people-centered development
(to ga in back confidence in polit ics); rights- and responsibi l it iy-based approach
(citizens ’ rights for development, participation and information); service orientation
(the politica l and organisationa l culture of the government has to become service-
oriented and accessible). Based on these principles, five “empowerment targets” were
set (Local Government Plan 2000, 1).
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Empowerment targets by the Local Government Plan
1) Devolution of political power
2) Decentrali z ation of ad ministrative authority
3) Deconcentration of management functions
4) Diffusion of the power-authority nex us (i.e . fighting nepotism)
5) Distribution of resources (e .g . finances through taxes)
St ructu re
In order to clearly divide powers and responsibilities between different local levels, the
Local Government has been (re)defined into three levels: the district level; the tehsil
level (sub-unit of a district); and the union level (sub-unit of a tehsi l, consisting of
several villages). For each of these three levels, councils have been elected by Pakistani
citizens during 2000/1. Seats have been reserved for women, minorities, and farmers on
every level.
Fig. 4  General structure of the Local Government (own graphic)
The most power lies with the districts, whose administration is responsible for the
issues of health, finance and planning, works and services, agriculture (under which
a lso forestry should have been located; see 3.7.3), education, l iteracy , community
deve lopment , informat ion technology , revenue , magistracy , and law . Monitoring
commi ttees of the D istrict Counc i l supervise the work of the administrat ion.
Additionally, police functions have been transferred to the district level. The police is
headed by a District Police Officer, who is elected by the Provincial Government.
Some tasks concerning finances, land use control , rura l planning and munic ipa l
standards have been devolved to the Tehsil Administration which again is controlled by
monitoring committees of the Tehsi l Counci l. Union Governments have only limited
administrative tasks, with each a secretary for munic ipa l functions and community
development. Below union level, two additional entities have been proposed by the
Loca l Government Plan: V il lage Counc i ls (V Cs) and C it izen Community Boards
(CCBs). Both of them should be in contact with their Union Council in order to tackle
communal problems. While V Cs are institutionalized, CCBs should be created through
local initiative.
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3.7.3 Current situation in the NWFP (as per June 2003)
A lthough e lect ions were he ld and a l l the counc i ls (except V Cs and C C Bs) and
administrative bodies in the N W FP were established, rea l power has not yet been
devolved from the Provincial to the District Government. This dilemma is very wel l
i l lustrated by the forestry sector: initial ly it was planned that al l forest-related issues
should be devolved from provincial to district level, thus relocating the control over the
Forest Department away from the Provincial Government. Yet as forestry is considered
very important, the provincial level did not agree and successfully thwarted the plan.
As a result, only farm forestry was relocated to the district level.
Similarly, V illage Councils and Citizen Community Boards did not work either from
the very beginning. None of the villages visited for this study so far established these
political bodies (for more details, see 5.4).
The main reasons for disagreement between province and districts are the degree of
control exercised by the province, and the distribution of funds between the two levels.
While many District Nazims complained about constant intensive control and sabotage
of their activities, the Provincial government blamed several Nazims for misusing their
powers and embezzlement in funds. This f ina l ly led to a demonstrative collective
resignation of a l l the N W FP District Nazims on June 1, 2003 (The News, June 2,
2003). Only after the personal intervention of President Musharraf and the assurance
that the ir powers would not be abridged, the Nazims dec ided to withdraw the ir
resignations on June 11, 2003.
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4 Selected stakeholder groups
This section presents the four stakeholder groups which for this study have been
considered as constituting the ‘ loca l leve l ’ . The context in which they act sha l l be
described, although none of these groups should be understood as a homogenous entity.
Relations between these stakeholder groups will be discussed in section 5.
4.1 Territorial Staff of the Forest Department
4.1.1 Staff and their roles and functions
A consistent definition of who belongs to the ‚ Territorial Staff ‘ (TS) or ‚ F ield Staff ‘ of
the Forest Department does not exist. For this study, Range Officers (ROs), Foresters
(Fs) and Forest Guards (FGs) are examined. Nevertheless, Divisional Forest Officers
(DFOs) have also been consulted and are mentioned where necessary.
Fig.5   Staff hierarchy of a territorial unit of the Forest Department (own graphic)
The N W FP is organized in three terri toria l uni ts (Ma lakand, Abbot tabad,
F A T A /South), each headed by a Conservator of Forests (CF). In Malakand Circle, for
instance, seven DFOs are superior to 22 ROs. Each Range consists of about two to five
blocks; each block of three to six beats.
For each level of the hierarchy, roles and functions are clearly prescribed. Out of these,
the most important ones are:
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Range Officer „(…) acts as a conduit between the TS (Forest Guard and Forester) and the
DFO and is responsible to supervise and control the field operations
according to the instructions issued to him by the DFO .“ (VLUP Methal, 22)
The Range O fficer is in charge of a range that consists of two to five Blocks.
Thus holding a key position within the department , he is provided with many
powers. A Range O fficer has the following main tasks to fulfil (prioriti z ation
as given by an interviewed RO):
•  Forest protection (preventing illicit cutting / smuggling)
•  Fulfill the requirements of com munities (handling applications for
construction tim ber)
•  Meet com munities (VDCs and / or JFMCs)
•  Supervise nurseries and soil conservation
•  Check harvesting operations
•  Prepare working plans
•  Co-ordinate and supervise subordinates and com municate orders to them
•  Deal with people coming to Range Q uarter with many different requests
Forester and
Forest Guard
„(…) are in charge and responsible for protection of forests against all sorts
of illegal usages by the local population and also carry out other operations
like fencing , planting etc.“ (VLUP Methal, 22)
A Forester is in charge of one block (that is why he is also called Block
Officer) consisting of three to six  beats. Every beat is controlled by one
Forest Guard . Main duties of Foresters and Forest Guards are:
•  Protect the forests by patrolling in the beat / block and on roadsides
•  Mark trees for harvesting
•  Work in the villages with VDCs resp . JFMCs (giving technical advise on
forestry issues such as nurseries, plantations; attending Monthly Meetings
of the com mittees)
•  Some Forest Guards are not in charge of a beat but are working on a road
checkpost or in a mobile patrolling squad . Being transferred frequently
within a block , most of them know all these different duties
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4.1.2 Formal and informal assets: Range Officer
Based on field interviews, the following assets can be identified for the Territorial
Staff.9
For m al assets
Having a lot of paperwork to deal with, the RO is equipped with a Range Quarter
where he has an office and rooms to live. Many of these Range Quarters were built
during colonial times and are sometimes in a rather poor condition. A ll visited Range
Quarters have a telephone and electricity, but the remote ones have no gas, so that they
have to heat by making fires. Electricity, gas and telephone bills have to be paid by the
RO himself as well as the fuel for the car that every RO has at his disposal. Ranked on
grade 16 in the governmenta l sca le, a Range Officer earns between Rs. 5’000 and
12‘000/month (depending on years on duty) with an annual increment of Rs. 295. For
the case that no Range Quarter is available, an allowance of approx. Rs. 550/month for
renting rooms is includued in this amount.
Range Officers require at least a BSc in forestry, yet most of them have a MSc. Thus,
ROs are often fluent in English. Being transferred every two or three years to another
range, they usual ly do not originate from their respective range. A RO has to write
Annual Confidential Reports (A CR) on his subordinates, judging their performance by
following a given framework. In the same way, a RO is judged by his DFO .
In for m al assets
Holding a key position in the FDs hierarchy, a RO has many possibilities to increase
his salary by informal means (the following examples are as given by a RO himself).
The RO is in charge of handing over the monthly salary to his subordinates (F , FG).
Thus he can cut their salaries in order to pay the electricity, phone and gas bill and the
fuel for his official car. Having the control over the finances for departmental nurseries
and plantations, the RO can de lay payments to loca ls or fake the accounts. In the
harvesting process, the RO can make a deal with the contractor by marking more of the
valuable species (not in accordance with the working plan). The contractor pays Rs. 1
to 2/cft to the RO for this service. Thus, one RO could earn additional Rs. 60‘000 in
just one month (before the ban and during its temporary lifting in 2001). Playing a key
part in the permit procedure for local timber use (compare 5.1.2), the RO can force
applicants to pay a certain amount for a permit.
4.1.3 Formal and informal assets: Forester and Forest Guard
For m al assets
Besides an official cap and a salary of about Rs. 4500/month (depending on years on
duty and with an annual increment of Rs. 80 for FGs; Rs. 120 for Fs), Foresters and
Forest Guards have no fac i l ities at a l l . They ne ither have a car for going to the ir
                                                      
9 In order to distinguish between ‘official ’ assets provided by the state and assets which result from
professional activity and/or other cirumstances,  the terms ‘ formal ’ and ‘ informal ’ will be used.
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„There are hundred-thousands of ways for the
field staff to earn more money.“
A Ra nge O fficer
respec t ive areas nor do they ge t money to cover the ir expenses for publ ic
transportation. No accomodation is available for them in their respective areas. Wood
or coal for heating the checkposts has to be organized and paid by the Forest Guards in
charge. Road Patrol Squads are equipped with a car by the FD , but not with the fuel
required to run it. Both Fs and FGs are allowed to carry a gun while on duty (compare
4.1.4), but are not equipped with any weapon by the department. Another burden that
mainly lasts on the lower F ield Staff is the fact that they have to cover all expenses for
a field visit of higher officials, such as accomodation and food. During a field visit it
could be observed that some members of the provincial assembly (MPAs) together with
their friends were using a forest resthouse for a private visit without paying one rupee,
although consuming a big amount of firewood. In that case, the costs had to be covered
by the chowkidar (watchman) of the lodge.
Foresters and Forest Guards are professiona ls, tra ined in a 6-months course at the
Sarhad Forest School. Having no BSc or MSc in forestry, it is impossible for them to
be promoted to the rank of a RO . Usually, Fs and FGs do not know English. But most
of them are locals, living in their respective area and therefore knowing very well the
social network – often much better than their superiors.
FGs and Fs can be transferred and appointed to certain duties (as well as be dismissed)
by the DFO . However, in daily work they are subordinate to their RO , who also writes
the ir A CR which is submitted to the D F O . The content of an A CR – as its name
suggests – must not be communicated to the respective subordinate, unless it contains a
serious complaint or an extraordinary praise.
 In for m al assets
Being the only responsible
for a huge area such as a
bea t or block , Fs and
especially FGs are in direct
contact with loca l people every day . Far from any controll ing authority (Range
Quarter), it is upon them whether or not to report any offender according to the official
procedure (a written report to the RO) or to settle the issue on the spot by mak ing a
deal with the involved people (compare 5.1). The same applies to F Gs working on
checkposts.
A simple calculation illustrates that these low-level officials are very much dependent
on such illegal ways of earning money: one FG interviewed has been working for more
than 20 years for the department, now earning Rs. 4800/month. With ten children at
home, this amount is hardly suffic ient to nourish his family , not to speak of other
expenses such as school materials, clothes etc.
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4.1.4  Legal framework and its interpretation
The current legal framework for the Territorial Staff ’s activities is the Forest Ordinance
2002, put in force in June 2002.10
A ll the ROs are very we l l informed about the lega l framework and the rules and
regulations, not only about its existence but also about its content and implications for
field activities. Foresters and Forest Guards usually know which rules are in force, but
differ widely in their interpretation if asked for details. During interviews in Hazara,
two issues turned out to be understood in many different ways both by Foresters and
Forest Guards.
How to h a ndle of fenders /  Collecting fines
Asked for the options they have if catching offenders in the forest (e.g. somebody
cutt ing a tree i l lega l ly), different Fs and F Gs give many different answers. The
variations are as follows:
• A FG can collect the fine on the spot , but he cannot issue a receipt because he has
no receipt book . For this, the offender has to be brought to the RO .
• The fine can never be collected on the spot . Every time , a report has to be written
and the offender has to be sent to the court .
•  The offender has to be brought to the court only if he resists or is unable to pay
the fine on the spot .
• O nly Fs and ROs are allowed to collect the fine on the spot .
• Fs and FGs are allowed to arrest offenders.
• Fs and FGs are not allowed to arrest offenders. O nly the police can do that .
One FG even gave two different interpretations of the same topic. The same variety can
be observed in Hazara Division if asking Fs and FGs for the amount of fines for forest
offences:
• Pine Rs. 150 / cft; Deodar 400 / cft; can depend on market value; doubled amount at
nighttime
•  Deodar 6 0 0 / cft , o ther species 3 0 0 / cft; doubled am ount if  caught for the second
time
•  For a ll  species the sa m e a m ou nt; 1 5 0 / cf t  i f  u n prepared ,  4 0 0 / cf t  i f  p repared ;
doubled at nighttime
• 150 / cft if unprepared , 300 / cft if prepared; doubled at nighttime
• Depending on: species, green or dry, prepared or unprepared , day or night
These statements lead to the impression that the rules on fining offenders are in fact
shaped by the Field Staff themselves in a rather individual manner.11
                                                      
10 In Swat District, some confusion regarding the actual legal framework exists. One DFO was of the
opinion that the Forest Ordinance 2002 has not been applied yet (February 2003), due to non-
compatibil ity with the lega l status of the F A T A ’s be longing to the Ma lakand Division. Yet FSP
representatives in Peshawar denied that.
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„The FSP reform is rater a re-
destruction than a reform.“
A Ra nge O fficer
Use of weapons
The same problem occurs if asking Hazara F ield Staff about the regulations on how to
use weapons on duty:
•  Fs and FGs are allowed to carry a weapon on duty but can only use it  for self-
defence . O nly a RO is allowed to open fire .
• Guns are not allowed for Fs and FGs.
• F and FG can use weapons in any case .
•  F an d FG can use weapons in  self-defence an d for stop ping cars (shooting on
tyres)
The first interpretation is the official one, given in the Forest Ordinance 2002: only
ROs are a l lowed to open fire on offenders. This fact has been critizised by many
officials, as in most cases, the Range Officer is not there when offenders are brought to
bay. Apart from this, the new Ordinance is very much welcomed by the F ield Staff, for
giving them more power and authority in their daily work.
4.1.5 Internal reform: awareness and criticism
Awa reness
Foresters and Forest Guards are not informed at all about the ongoing reforms within
the department . Most of them think that the reform only consists of the new
participatory approach of V illage Land Use Planning (V LUP). Only one Forester said
that FSP contacted him once for his opinion on V LUP. Most of the staff only realized
that things are changing when a Community Deve lopment Organizer (C D O) was
appointed to their division. This might be true in most of the cases; but it also might
serve as a welcomed excuse to avoid new tasks. A lso Range Officers said that they
have not been involved in designing the new setup of the department, but at least got
more information than their subordinates on current and future changes.
Criticism
Many interv iewed off i-
c ia ls (even up to D F Os)
think that FSP was too far
from the fie ld rea l ities in
order to be able to real ize serious and practicable reforms. Not being informed in a
proper way, many reject FSP in general as working in a top-down manner and being
completely donor-driven.12
                                                                                                                                               
11 Southwold (2002, 9f) comes to the same conclusion: „ (…) the implementation of their [Fs and FGs]
discretionary powers do not simply reflect different contexts; but also their individual interpretations of
the government policy which is reflected in the ir different constructions and practices. (…) The
interpretation of the law is diverse among different Forest Guards, as is their implementation of the
law.“
12 Jan Willem Nibbering, a consultant at FSP, confirmed that  it was an initial decision not to involve
FGs, Fs and ROs in discussing the new setup. Their involvement started in 2003 only, by discussing
their new job descriptions.
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Suggestions
Asked for what they would like to change within the department, a majority of the
interviewed staff ment ioned that the ir fac i l it ies should be improved. The genera l
opinion is that the department heavily increased the duties of the Territorial Staff, but at
the same time decreased their faci l ities. The following issues have been mentioned
several times, both in Swat and Hazara Division:
• More salary
• Motorbikes or cars for the Territorial Staff
• Mobile phones or walkie-talk ies for better co-ordination among the TS
• Travel allowances for Fs and FGs if they use public transport on duty
• Uniforms for the TS to gain more authority
• Allowances to buy shoes (FGs walk a lot and have to buy new shoes frequently.)
• Coal for heating checkposts
Many Foresters and Forest Guards in Swat hoped for a soon approval of the new Forest
Ordinance to gain more power and authority in their daily work (i.e. use of weapons
and uniforms).13
4.2 CDEGD Staff
4.2.1 Roles and functions
Fig.6 The C DEGD (Co m m unity Develop m ent ,  Ex tension and Gender d irectorate) and the other
speciali z ed directorates of the new FD setup . O nly the black bordered officials were appointed and
active a t  the t im e o f research – th is i l lustra tes how isola ted C D Os an d FFEs are act ing .  (P&M:
Plan n in g an d  Monitorin g ; HRM: Inst i tu t ional D evelo p m ent an d  H u m an Resource Manage m ent
directorate; R&D: Research and Develop m ent). (own graphic, based on: GoNWFP, Presentation on
the Devolution and Re-Organi z ation Plan 2000 , 22)
                                                      
13 Compare footnote No.10.
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The CDEGD field staff consist of Community Development Organizers (CDO), both
ma le and fema le; Fema le Forest Extensionists (F F E) as we l l as Junior and Senior
Forest Technicians (JFT resp. SFT). The main tasks of the CDEGD field staff are as
follows:
• Guidance and assistance to the Territorial Staff at all levels in issues of com m unity
develop ment and ex tension .
• Awareness raising and motivation of rural com munities for NRM.
•  Guidance and assistance to co m m unities in  VLUP and JFM .  C D O focus on social
organi z ation and participatory planning process.
•  Maintain village organi z ations after their establish ment , keep regular contact and
continuosly support their functioning (i.e . to attend the m onthly m eetings of the
com mittees).
• Assist Territorial Staff in training of VDCs, WOs and JFMCs.
•  F ie l d  co-or d in a t io n  o f  co m m u n i ty  d eve lo p m e n t ,  e x t e nsio n  a n d  g e n d e r  &
develop ment activities with other agencies and organi z ations.
•  C D Os should m onitor whether a participatory approach is effectively followed by
area management staff and com m unities in all steps of VLUP and JFM . Monitoring
and evaluation of the performance of VDCs, WOs, and JFMCs.
•  Fe m ale  C D Os with  FFEs to  ensure  m echan isms o f  e xchan g e an d  ne g ot ia t io n
between VDCs and WOs.
This means that ma le C D Os wi th the support of Junior and/or Senior Forest
Technicians (if available) are responsible to deal with the male population in a selected
village and to establish a V illage Development Committee (V D C), whereas female
C D Os and/or F F Es dea l wi th the fema le popula t ion and establ ish a Women
Organization (WO). Once a committee is established, the follow-up including trainings
and technical advice should be handed over to the Territorial Staff. The process of
building a V DC in a village has been described by a CDO as follows:
„First , we establish contact with the people , e x plaining our participatory approach . This can
be done by convincing influential people , who themselves e x plain it to the com mon people
in the village . A fter they understand the idea and agree to participate , we start to build  a
VD C .  T h is ta k es ab ou t one m onth ,  so m etim es u p  to  three m onths .  When the VD C is
estab lished ,  the p lan nin g process starts .  A f ter a  p lan is ap proved an d im ple m entat ion
starts, the C D O should attend the m onthly meetings of the VD Cs and proceed the minutes
to the DFO . Thus, the C D O represents the VD C towards the Forest Department . If we work
on VDC building and planning , we handle three villages at once during four months.“
A lthough be ing part of the C D E G D directorate, C D Os and F F Es are under direct
control of their respective Divisional Forest Officer in daily work.
4.2.2 Formal and informal assets
The assets available to CDEGD field staff vary considerably in different areas covered
by this study. Thus, no general picture can be drawn. Some CDOs (female as well as
male) have a car at their disposal whenever they go for field visits, while others should
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have one theoretical ly but hardly can get it on time because other people from the
Territorial Staff are using it on other purpose. Some CDOs and F F Es have an own
office, equipped with computers and all the required infrastructure, while others do not
even have a chair to sit on.
All interviewed CDOs (female and male) have a MSc, most of them in social sciences,
but also in economy or  international relations. FFEs usually attended school up to 12th
class and were prepared for the job in a 3-months training. Obviously, not all of them
have been selected according to their professional qualifications; in some cases it was
reported that they only got the job due to private relations to higher officials in the
Forest Department. This often results in a weak motivation and performance. Yet the
opposite could be observed, too: one female CDO left her former job as a teacher to
start working for the FD , although the salary was less than before.
Ranked on grade 16, CDOs have an initial income of about Rs. 4’300/month, F FEs
about Rs. 2’500/month. Most of them have a contract with the CDEGD directorate in
Peshawar. Such contracts are often va l id for a very short period of t ime only ,
sometimes not more than 3 months. By the end of this period or a the end of the year,
the DFO and/or the ROs of the respective area write an Annual Confidential Report
(A CR) on the C D O . This report goes to the C D E G D directorate and has a ma jor
influence on the renewal of the contract. Some CDOs report on their own subordinates,
e.g. on SFTs, JFTs or drivers. A ll CDEGD field staff report on a regular basis and
directly to the directorate in Peshawar on the ir working progress. Apart from that,
meetings with the CDEGD director in Peshawar take place frequently.
No general statement can be made on the payment of T A /D A . Some CDOs say to get
their allowances whenever they go for field visits or for workshops in Peshawar, while
others have to pay al l expenses on their own, even bus trips to and accomodation in
Peshawar when attending meetings or workshops.
It thus seems that most of the assets avai lable to the CDEGD staff in the field very
much depends on their direct superiors, especially on their DFO . This fact is discussed
in detail in section 5.2.
Last but not least, C D Os and F F Es are often ‚greenhorns ’  in the department. This
implies that they do not know the internal ‚rules of the game ’ as well as the members of
the Territorial Staff do. This and the fact that they are not directly involved in jobs
related to harvesting and transportation of timber makes it more or less impossible for
them to use informal networks in order to increase their salaries – although they earn
about the same or even less than the Territorial Staff.
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4.2.3 Internal reform: awareness and criticism
Awa reness
Being part of a recently created branch of the FD , the CDEGD staff are generally better
informed about the ongoing reforms than the Territorial Staff. Most of them have been
informed in initial trainings about the current changes in the department. Because their
professional future very much depends on the success of the FSP reform, they generally
show more interest towards the new participatory approach than the Territorial Staff.
Criticism
As CDEGD staff in different areas are subject to very different working conditions, it is
not possible to give a general impression. Some of them are happy with their current
status, while others are not at all. However, a majority critizised the abovementioned
short-term contracts, resulting in ongoing uncertainty and weakening their motivation.
Most of the CDOs say that the area they are responsible for is too big for one person
only, so that they are not able to spend sufficient time on all the selected villages. Some
also complained about the low salaries, which were below the minimum for a grade 16-
official. The repeated criticism abou the involvement and co-operation of the Territorial
Staff in V LUP/JFM is discussed in section 5.2. It can be said that nearly al l of the
issues mentioned by the CDEGD staff relate to internal problems within the FD itself.
Suggestions
The desire to get a permanent status equal to the Territorial Staff has been expressed
several times. CDEGD staff with few infrastructural assets asked for better support by
their superiors or – even more desired – by their own directorate. Several respondents
expect that their situation will improve as soon as the CDEGD assistant directors would
be appointed to their respective division (to the CF ’s office).
4.3 Local people
Because it is not the aim of this study to analyse the situation of local residents, this
overview on their environmental and socio-economical setting and their use of forest
resources is rather superficial. Nevertheless, some basic informations are required in
order to make the subsequent section on interactions between stakeholder groups better
understandable.
4.3.1 Environmental setting: resources and their condition
In general, forests close to the villages are in a rather bad condition and depleting at an
a larming rate . Espec ia l ly in we l l accessible areas c lose to sett lements, where in
accordance with maps of the FD dense forest should be found, often not a single tree is
left. Most of the remaining trees are heavily lopped, while young trees are very rare.
Most of the we l l-stocked forest rema ins in inaccessible and remote locations only ,
where cutting and extracting of trees is too difficult and costly.
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Possible causes for the condition of forests as seen by different stakeholders will be
discussed in section 5.1. However, it can be said that a vast majority of local people
agrees to the fact that the forests are decreasing very quickly and that the current
situation is much worse than ten years ago. Me thal (Hazara) is the only exception,
where due to the work of the local Joint Forest Management Committee (JFMC), most
of the villagers observed an improvement of forest resources.
4.3.2 Socio-economic setting: livelihood assets
Physica l assets
In most of the villages visited, access roads are unmetalled, in a bad condition or not
available at all (e.g. Methal). None of the villages has a pipe gas connection, electricity
is very rare and usua l ly ava i lable to a few households only . There are no phone
connections. Most of the villages have primary and middle schools, but it could be
observed that some of them do not run smoothly. In some cases, girls‘ schools had to
be closed due to the non-availability of teachers. None of the villages visited had any
dispensary or other hea lth care fac i l ities – only in Dabargai , medicaments can be
bought.
Fin a nci a l assets
Main income for most of the people are remittances of relatives working in Lahore,
Karachi or abroad. Agricultural production mainly serves for subsistence and is often
not enough to be sold on markets. Illegal cutting of trees for sale is widespread both in
Protected and Reserved Forests. Timber and firewood is illegally sold on local markets
(compare 5.1.3). Protected forests: Before the ban on timber harvesting has been
imposed, royalties paid by the FD have been a very important (but irregular) income
for owners of shares in the forest. Reserved forest : No legal income from reserved
forests is possible.
N atu r a l asstes
The condition of forests has been described above. The steep terrain and the usual ly
harsh c l imatic conditions l imit agricultura l production. Ma in crops are wheat and
maize. Rangeland is used for grazing. Water resources seem to decrease as most of the
people say that rain- and snowfall became very rare during the last ten years.
Hum a n assets
Populat ion of the study vi l lages varies between 1’600 and 6’300.14 Loca l job
opportunities are very rare. As a result, many households have at least one ma le
member in labour migration (in Lahore, Karachi or abroad). With 35,4%, even the
official literacy rate is quite low – and even less for women (compare 3.1.3). The health
status has not been investigated.
                                                      
14 Numbers drawn from the respective V illage Land Use Plans.
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Soci a l assets
This is a too wide topic to be dicussed in a few words only. A t least it can be said that
the communit ies – in contrast to some statements found in V L UPs – cannot be
understood as homogenous entities. Rich and poor families, landowners and tenants,
educated and uneducated people all have different interests and possibilities and follow
different l ive l ihood strategies. Severa l interna l conflicts on resource use could be
observed, some of them discussed in section 5.1. The j irga system exists in all study
villages, although it lost some of its influence on conflict resolution. More and more
conflicts are solved through court decision, or – if about natural resources – by the
V DC or JFMC .
4.3.3 Forest use and ownership of shares
Due to the different legal status of Protected (PF) and Reserved Forest (RF), ownership
status and the use of forest resources differ widely in Swat and Hazara. Nevertheless,
some facts are valid for both regions: The average per capita need of firewood has been
calculated as 1.5m3/year (Khattak 1995, 11f). The same author estimates for Methal
(Hazara) that every year 4% of all houses are under construction or renovation, and that
for constructing a new house, about 30 m3 of standing trees volume are required
(Khattak 1995, 12). It can be assumed that these figures are more or less the same for
other villages both in Hazara and Swat.
Another common phenomenon is illegal cutting and timber smuggling. While cutting
of trees and transportation is mainly done by locals, wire-pullers and employers are
often wealthy and influential people living in regional centres. Many locals and FD
officials identify timber smuggling as one of the main threats to forests (see section 5.1
for details). Forests are also used as grazing grounds for livestock (mainly sheeps and
goats, few cattles). In many forests, medica l herbs and plants are collected, a job
mainly done by women.
In Protected Forest, some sections of the communities have substantial rights to use the
forest. They receive between 60 and 80% from the sale of produce (so-called royalties,
which have not been paid anymore since the ban was imposed). The forests, however,
are de jure owned by the state. Thus, both owners and non-owners of shares are only
allowed to cut a tree for construction with a permit issued by the FD . Reserved Forests
are exclusive property of the state and bear only minor concessions to the local people.
The option of permits for cutting a tree does not exist. Guzara Forests are lega l ly
owned by landowners, but the right of management lies with the FD . The owners have
to apply for a permit if they want to cut a tree in their forest. Non-owners have no right
for permits, so that their only way to get one is to apply indirectly through an owner.
4.3.4 Main priorities for development
Main problems identified by local people concentrate on infrastructure, although men
and women set different priorities for development. For men, improvement of roads is
by far the most important issue in all the villages visited, followed by a better drinking
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water supply. Local job opportunities, better schools, electricity and gas supply, tree
plantations and nurseries plus health care units have also been mentioned several times.
For women, income generation and trainings on women’s activities such as livestock
management, animal husbandry and traditional birth attendance, as wel l as a better
drinking water supply and better education for girls are the topmost priorities (V LUPs
Methal, Dabargai, Chel and Shungli).
4.3.5 Awareness and acceptance of local committees
The activities of local committees and their co-operation with the FD will be discussed
in section 5.1. However, it seems interesting to what extent these committees are
known and accepted within the villages. For this, non-members from different social
groups were consulted.
Generally speaking, most local residents know about the existence of a V DC . They are
aware that some kind of committee has been constituted, and many people also know
that the committee is somehow related to forest protection. Many put their hopes in the
work of that committee, especial ly to protect the forests from offenders, to al low a
better permit procedure but also to improve the village ’s general infrastructure. Yet
most of these non-members did not get any benefits from the process so far. Many said
that the ir committee did not show much activity yet. Only few people complete ly
disown the loca l committee , condemning it as a „band of thieves“ (a vi l lager in
Shungli, Hazara) that would only work for its own benefit.
In Methal , where a JFMC has already been working for some years, people are mostly
satisfied with the ir committee ’s achievements. The permit procedure, in which the
committee plays a crucial part, brought real benefits to several people. A ll respondents
know the committee and some of its activities. Just one man had the impression that the
JFMC would work for rich people only, but he also admitted that in the end, it achieved
more than the Local Government. Another man who has been a JFMC member some
years ago compla ined about the lack of transparency in the committee ’s f inanc ia l
issues, but was genera l ly sat isf ied, too. He added that jea lousy was a common
phenomenon in villages such as Me tha l  – as soon as somebody would start to do
something successfully, others would become suspicious and would try to hinder him
wherever possible.
4.4 Local Government
4.4.1 Forest Protection Committees (FPCs)
Members of the two District Councils of Mingora (Swat) and Mansehra (Hazara) were
interviewed. With one exception, all respondents are members of a Forest Protection
Committee on district level.
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Fig. 7 Structure of the Local Govern m ent .  Forest Protection Co m mittees (FPCs) e x ist on d istrict
level only (own graphic)
Whereas Union and Tehsi l Counci ls have l imited influence only and thus can each
build a few internal committees only, District Councils form numerous committees to
supervise the act ivit ies of the D istrict Administrat ion. Despite forestry was not
devolved to the District Government (compare 4.4.2), both District Counci ls visited
established a so called ‚ Forest Protection Committee ’ .
Constitution a nd members’ background
There seems to be no specific internal rule on how a committee on district level must
be constituted and how it should work . This would at least explain the differences
between the two committees examined: the FPC Mingora consists of seven members
from different rural, forested areas within Mingora District. Among them, some own
shares in the forest in their respective area, while others are non-owners. In Manshera
District, the FPC consists of five members, all of them owners of Guzara Forests. There
are no female members in both of the committees.
Activities
The story of the FPC Manshera is quickly told: the committee has been constituted in
2002 but never started to work (for its future plans on co-operation with the FD , see
5.3). The FPC Mingora  turned out to be more active: the committee holds regular
meetings with representatives of the Forest Department in order to discuss current
problems and to forward suggestions from the local to higher levels of the FD . One
committee member in Mingora said that he could already mediate between the FD and
his village when a conflict about plantations arose. The committee understands itself as
sort of a mediator between the FD and local people (for the local people ’s view on that,
see 5.5).
Funds
None of the two committees examined has any funds available for implementing own
activities. Both FPCs can only discuss, advise and mediate.
Perception of environment
A ll interviewed FPC members compla ined about severe deforestat ion in the ir
respective areas. Population increase and lack of energy resources in remote villages
were ment ioned repea tedly as possible causes. Harsh cri t ic ism of the Forest
Department ’s previous harvesting practices was raised as well as the complaint that FD
plantations hardly ever showed any result. A ll FPC members were of the opinion that
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the ban on timber harvesting declared in 1993 has had an adverse effect, leading to
increased illicit cutting both by local people and the ‘ timber mafia ’ .
4.4.2 Farm forestry
Under the Local Government Plan 2000, only farm forestry on private agricultural land
and raising of private nurseries has been relocated (or ‚devolved’) from provincial to
district leve l . Important (‘hard’) issues such as harvesting, marking, preparation of
plans and plantations remained with the FD on provincial level. It is expected that these
relocated ‚soft issues’ rather bring costs than any income for the District Government.
It can therefore not surprise that the D istrict Counc i ls hardly show any initiative
regarding farm forestry. In Mansehra District, nothing happened since the setup of the
new Local Government. In Mingora District, one plantation could be realized during
2002 with a budget of Rs. 50'000. For 2003, the same amount will be avai lable for
further plantations and/or nurseries. However, council members in Mingora admitted
that a true strategy for farm forestry was still missing, although one Range Officer, one
Forester and three Forest Guards have been appointed to work with the district
administration’s Agricultural Director.
Several council members expressed their hope that some day, all the tasks of the FD
would be relocated to the district level – together with other ‚rich’ departments now
sti l l with the provincial level. A ll in al l, they bel ieve in the new setup of the Local
Government and accept that its implementation will take a long time.
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5 Relations between selected
stakeholders
This section examines the re lations and interactions between the four stakeholder
groups. The framework which has been introduced in section 1 serves as an ‘optical
guideline ’ in order to make this section better understandable.
5.1 Local people – Territorial Staff
and CDEGD Field Staff
Because the re la t ions be tween loca l people and the
Territorial Staff are manifold and rather complex, not all
their details can be discussed. The situations in Protected
Forests (Swat), Reserved and Guzara Forests (Hazara) will
be distinguished whenever major differences occur. F irst,
‚ traditional ’ links such as prosecution of offenders and the
permit procedure is discussed and only afterwards, ‚new’
links such as V illage Land Use Planning (V LUP) and/or
Joint Forest Management are presented.15
5.1.1 Perception of legal situation and forest ownership
Protected Forests (Swat)
The fact that in Protected Forests, some people own shares in the forest (compare 4.3)
while others do not makes that situation more complex. Many shareholders perceive
the forest in which they hold shares as their own property, thus not accepting the legal
ownership by the state. The impression could be gained that most of them know the
legal definition but do not care. Non-owners or users usual ly do not think about the
legal status of forests – if they want to use forest products, they have to deal with the
respective shareholder, not the FD . The Territorial Staff of the FD generally know very
well the legal status of the Protected Forests.
Reserved a nd Guz a r a  Forests (H a z a r a)
Even in villages with various types of forests (e.g. Shungl i vil lage), loca l residents
seem to be more aware of the legal situation. Guzara owners usually know very well
what belongs to them and what kind of rights they enjoy in their own forests, while
non-owners are aware of the state ’s ownership of Reserved Forests. The same is vaild
for the Territorial Staff.
                                                      
15 The following terms will be used: ‚owners ’  means owners of shares in the forest, while ‚users ’
describes non-owners or tenants.
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5.1.2 Permit procedure and quotas
Protected Forests (Swat) : loca l people
Whether or not people use legal ways to apply for a timber harvesting permit differs
widely between the study villages. In Bar Lalku, none of the owners ever applied,
arguing that this was their own forest (compare above) and that only outsiders would
need a permit. They also said that the whole permit procedure would take too long and
would be too expensive (up to Rs. 8000). One respondent mentioned an agreement with
the government, al lowing local people to cut as much as they wanted, while another
said to pay about Rs. 200 to the FG if felling a tree. In fine, nobody knew exactly about
the local qouta. Some said that 380 trees/year would be allotted to Bar Lalku, another
mentioned 300 trees/y for Bar and Kuz Lalku together. A third respondent never heard
of any quota. Users usually do not care for applications and permits – they directly deal
with the owners.
In Dabargai , however, people still use the legal way of applications. Both owners and
users apply individually for a permit in the beginning of every year. They hand in their
applications at the RO ’s office. If a permit is refused, they contact their V DC for a
second chance. Then the V DC would discuss every application and contact the RO
aga in. Neverthe less, people were not satisfied with the way the ir applications are
handled. The process would be too lengthy, usually taking two to five months. It also
happened that a permit was issued but afterwards, no FG came to mark the tree. Several
people mentioned that it was difficult to find the RO and that they had to visit the
Range quarter several times until they could hand over their application. Opinions on
the quota differed from 15 trees/y to one tree per capita each year. Most respondents
said that the quota was not sufficient.
Protected Forests (Swat) : Ter r itor ia l St a f f
Forest Guards and the Forester of Lalku Block interpreted the local quota differently.
360 trees/y would be allotted to people residing outside the village, while only six trees
a year could be used by local residents. The Forester in charge admitted that this quota
was too small and that the demand would be much more, resulting in widespread illicit
cutting. He thus advocated an increase of the quota.
The RO responsible for D abargai said that three quotas existed: A local quota (20
trees/y) for local use through applications; a central quota for emergent needs (e.g.
when a house burns down); plus a concessional rate for people living in other areas
devoid of trees. He said that the permit procedure was the same as it had been under the
Wal i, and that the applications would be handled as quick as possible. Usual ly, the
procedure would take three to six months. A Forester mentioned that nowadays, people
would get smaller trees than in the past. Because of that, the local quota would not be
sufficient anymore for house construction.
Relations between selected stakeholders
59
Reserved Forests (H a z a r a) : loca l people
In most areas with Protected Forests, people still have no right to apply for permits. For
them, the only legal way to get timber is by purchasing it on local markets. In Methal ,
however, a permit procedure was introduced in which the local JFMC plays a crucial
part: all applications can be handed over to the committee that checks together with the
Territoria l Staff whether or not the applicant is in urgent need. A  ma jority of
respondents in Methal was satisfied with this procedure, even accepting the payment of
Rs. 200 to 300/permit to the committee ’s joint account. The process would take two
weeks up to a maximum of five months. Many respondents reported that before the
committee was constituted, the TS had to be bribed for every tree with up to Rs. 2’000.
However, a few people opposed this view . Some blamed the JF M C for preferring
influential people, not forwarding poor people ’s applications in the same manner. A
member of the JFMC also said that the co-operation of the FD got worse, issuing two
to three permits per year only, far less than in past years. The same respondent said that
the FD again started to take money (Rs. 2’000 to 3’000) for each permit.
Reserved Forests (H a z a r a) : Ter r itor ia l St a f f
The generally good impression of the permit procedure was confirmed by the Range
Officer in charge and his subordinates. The RO only complained that not everybody
would pay the Rs. 200 to the joint account yet, as was agreed. According to him, the
permit procedure would take 20 to 30 days. Nobody would have to pay the FD for a
permit.
Guz a r a  Forests (H a z a r a) : loca l people
Several Guzara owners have been interviewed in Shungli village. A ll of them said to
hand over their applications to the RO in Shergarh but complained that with three to six
months, the whole process would take too much time. Getting a permit or not would
often be a gamble. Most of the owners said that they had to pay the TS all the time,
well aware of the fact that this was not an official fee but a bribe. Amounts would vary
from Rs. 1’000 to 4’000/tree. One respondent said to give the money to a FG who
himself would distribute the it among his colleagues. Yet other owners never had to
pay anything for a permit. Users, not allowed to apply directly, usually ask an owner to
apply for them. Yet some could directly pay a F G in order to get timber. Another
respondent admitted never to wait with cutting a tree until a permit was issued.
Guz a r a  Forests (H a z a r a) Ter r itor ia l St a f f
The RO in charge assured that no money has to be paid for any permit. Usually, the
process would take about one month. He also confirmed the (legal) practice of users
applying through owners. A Forester was convinced that al l people would apply for
permits and thus, no illicit cutting would occur. Not all of his colleagues shared this
opinion (compare 5.1.3).
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„It is better to bribe. If you don’t, they [the TS]
take even more by imposing legal fines.“
A villager  of Shungli
5.1.3 Forest protection by the Territorial Staff
Loca l people
Besides the permit procedure, one of the main interferences between local people and
the TS takes place in the forest i tse l f . Many respondents a lready made some
experiences when they were caught by the TS while cutting trees i l lega l ly . The ir
descriptions of these incidents give a – subjective – impression of ‚ field realities’ . In
Bar Lalku (Swat), some respondents said that the FG would never hinder them cutting
timber for private use, while others had to pay in any case. Usually, people paid the FG
or F on the spot, what means that no legal case followed the incident. O thers paid in
timber instead in cash, usually between one third and one sixth of the felled amount.
Several people said that a good private relationship with the TS would help to reduce
fines. One man even stated that he already cut some trees illegally by order of a FG .
In other villages such as Dabargai and Chel (Swat), the situation seems to be different.
Here, nobody ever paid any fine on the spot, but only after a legal report to the FD and
the court was made. This might be true if considering the already important role of the
V D C D abarga i  in the permit procedure. However, the fact that the ne ighbouring
village of Che l is widely known as being full of timber smugglers (up to 50%, as one
villager estimated) raises some doubts. The situation in Shungli (Hazara) is very similar
to that in Bar Lalku. Several respondents – both Guzara owners and users – said that
they had to bribe the TS with amounts between Rs. 2’000 and 6’000. Aga in, the
importance of a personal, good relationship with FG and F was pointed out.
Only in Me thal (Hazara), the situation seems to be different. Here, the local JFMC
initiated own controls, sending small patrols to the forests. FGs or Fs join these patrols
from t ime to t ime . Thus, no irregularit ies have been reported with regard to the
punishment of offenders.
Represen ta t i ves of  the
committee said that the size
of the fine was depending
on the  wea l th of the
offender, but was usual ly Rs. 100/cft. The whole amount would flow into the joint
account of the committee and the FD . Confiscated timber would be given to villagers in
need, with the consent of the RO .
In al l study locations, people reported that the Territorial Staff were present in the
forests al l the time. Especial ly F Gs would patrol every day. Nevertheless (with the
abovementioned exception of Methal), the general opinion is that the TS do not follow
the law when catching offenders. The opinion that especially FGs and Fs are heavily
involved in timber smuggling is widespread. In Me thal , the general opinion on the
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Territorial Staff ’s work was good. Few people only criticizised that FGs and Fs would
not regularly join the committee ’s patrols.
Several villagers both in Swat and Hazara said that they already reported offenders to
the RO , thus trying to support the TS in fulfilling their job. Yet these hints had not
always been followed by the concerned ROs.
Ter r itor ia l St a f f
Asked whether an effective control in their respective areas would be possible, most of
the TS said that only the control of organized smuggler groups was a problem (for
smuggling, see 5.1.4). Some officials mentioned the fact that the rural population was
increasing every day, while the number of FGs and Fs remained the same, or would
even decrease. The TS in charge of Methal said to join the local committee ’s patrols
irregularly. Several staff members confirmed that some people would report to them on
offenders, saying that such hints were always taken serious. The Territorial Staff ’s
perception of how fines are collected and when offenders should be reported has been
given under 4.1.4. The conclusions drawn there seem to confirm the villagers’ reports
of an arbitrary way of confl ict resolut ion between loca l people and the Forest
Department on field level.
5.1.4 Reasons for deforestation as seen by villagers and TS
Loca l people
Except in Me thal , most respondents agreed that the condition of forests worsened
during the last ten years. Notably owners of shares in Protected Forests and Guzara
owners complained a heavy deforestation, while users described the situation a bit less
dramatically.16 Loca l consumption of fue lwood and construction timber as we l l as
grazing in the forest were mentioned as main reasons. Surprisingly, many people did
not blame the FD for insufficient controls but said that local control mechanisms were
missing. The ban on timber harvesting was identified as the main reason for an increase
in illicit cutting: Many said to have lost their jobs when legal harvesting stopped in
their area. Smuggling, carried out by locals and outsiders jointly in a well organized
network and often supported by the TS, was another ma in reason put forward. In
Hazara, below average precipitation during the last ten years was mentioned more than
once. Last but not least, nearly every respondent complained a lack of alternate energy
resources such as gas or electricity.
General ly, there is a common understanding of some basic problems: many people
rea l ize very we l l the interre lat ion between poverty and deforestat ion, and often
                                                      
16 One interpretation for that could be that owners suffer a direct financial loss if ‚ their’ forest disappears,
as no royalties will be paid anymore when no trees are left to be harvested.
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„In the past, smugglers just had eggs and donkeys.
Nowadays, they have kalashnikovs and cars.“
A Forester
formulate ideas on how the situation could be improved. The Territoria l Staff are
heavily crit ic ized as support ing i l lega l cutt ing by corrupt ion and involvement in
smuggling, but often local weaknesses are admitted as well. Many people realize that
without local control mechanisms, a true protection would be impossible.
In Methal , most respondents reported an improvement of forest resources over the last
few years. Many observed more young trees and undergrowth. A ll interviewed people
attributed this to the effectiveness of the local JFMC with regular controls and honest
working practices. Il l icit cutting seems to have nearly disppeared, with only a few
loca ls st i l l ignoring the committee ’s authority . A ccording to most respondents,
smuggling completely disappeared in Methal.
Ter r itor ia l St a f f
Most of the F Gs, Fs and ROs agreed that the forests are decreasing at an alarming
rate.17 Only in Me tha l  vil lage, the ma jority of the TS was satisfied with the latest
development, being a result of a functioning Joint Forest Management as they said.
Yet asked for reasons for the heavy deforestation, opinions on different hierarchical
leve ls differed wide ly , espec ia l ly between fie ld- and D F O-leve l . In the opinion of
Forest Guards, Foresters and Range Officers, the ma in (and often only) cause of
deforestation was the local consumption of fuelwood and construction timber, caused
by an increasing population, widespread poverty and the non-availability of alternate
energy sources. T imber smuggling was often mentioned as secondary reason. One RO
only located organizational weaknesses within the FD .
DFOs identified several reasons for deforestation: While all of them agreed with the TS
on population increase and poverty as major threats, they additionally stressed timber
smuggling as a very serious
problem. Moreover, several
D F Os crit ized the former
management prac t ices of
the FD (i.e. the contractor-
system for timber harvesting) and the fact that even nowadays, members of the TS
would not follow the law they should enforce. A ll of them agreed that the ban on
timber harvesting had a devastating effect on the forests by stimulating illegal cutting.
Many FGs, Fs and ROs complained the numerous new roads and tracks that were built
in their respective areas during the last few years, saying that effective controls would
thus become more difficult. They stressed the fact that smuggling was often organized
by rich and influential people not living in the villages but in regional centres, often
                                                      
17 Only in the Bar Lalku area, all the Territorial Staff said that the forest was more dense than before,
mainly thanks to a change of attitude in the villages – an perception that differs diametrically from the
villagers’ statements.
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members of the Local Government. Thus, smuggling was wel l organized, and local
people hired as henchmen would be very well equipped with pickup cars and weapons.
Most of the smuggling activities would take place at night or on Friday, when most
officials attend juma prayer. Numerous incidents were reported when FD officials tried
in vain to stop cars, often risking their own lives. Smugglers often would not shrink
from beating FGs and Fs, pushing FD cars off the road or even shooting at everybody
who was in their way. Thus, one FG had recently been killed on duty, while another
interviewed Forester was shot in the knee two years ago.
5.1.5 Co-operation on VLUP /  JFM
As the situations in the four study villages differ widely, they are discussed separately.
General observations are given at the end of the section.
Ba r La lku (Swat) : VDC members18
Constituted in September 2002, the V DC was still very young at the time of research.
This is why no activities have taken place so far, except monthly meetings in which all
committee members and interested non-members participate. It was reported that the
constitution of the committee took place in a participatory way, and the committee
members expressed their satisfaction with the procedure. Many different social groups
are represented. A V illage Land Use Plan (V LUP) has been final ized by the FD in
November 2002. However, it seems that the committee was not involved in the
planning process, as none of the committee members did know the plan. Nevertheless,
they hope for the FD „to solve all our problems“ . Asked for their own priorities, they
stressed the need for road improvement and other infrastructural interventions.
The committee was satisfied with the support from the Range Officer and the social
organizer working for FMC . Both of them would attend every V DC monthly meeting,
unlike the F Gs and the F . It cannot surprise that the young committee did not yet
develop a ‚common sense ’ about the future co-operation with the F D . While some
argued that the committee would not survive without any guidance and financ ia l
support from the department, others insisted that the V DC would be able to protect the
forest on its own, saying that any co-operation with the FD would be impossible due to
its corruption. Some suggested to work with the RO and with FMC only. A ll in all, the
V DC members did not observe any change in the Territorial Staff ’s attitude so far.
                                                      
18 Bar Lalku has been selected by FMC as a pilot village for Joint Forest Management (JFM) activities.
Although no Joint Forest Management Committee has been constituted at the time of research, the two
approaches run integrated and the social organizer from FMC is working closely with the existing
V DC .
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Ba r La lku (Swat) : Ter r itor ia l a nd CDEGD St a f f
Statements of the Forest Guards and the Forester in charge turned out to be very
contradictory. While some of them said that the forest condition improved very much
due to the good work of local committees, others complained that local people would
not show any interest to protect the forest and to co-operate with the FD . However,
they admitted to dislike the idea of sharing power and influence with local committees.
The social organizer working for FMC reported that when the F and his FGs realized
that V L UP would threaten the ir power, they never aga in attended any committee
meetings. Even the CDO in charge would not support the process. A fter being involved
in the initial phase of the process he did not show up anymore although FMC contacted
him several times. A possible reason for that might be that he was overburdened with
work in other vil lages, or that the presence of both the V L UP and JF M approach
created some misunderstandings (and welcomed excuses).
D aba rga i (Swat) : VDC members
The  committee was constituted in  November 2001. A ccording to members, the
const itut ion process was part ic ipatory , so that many different soc ia l groups are
represented in the committee . Each one tra ining on bee-keeping and agricultura l
extension has taken place since , in which three loca l residents part ic ipated. Two
nurseries and one plantat ion could be established, the latter guarded by a loca l
watchman. Grazing could be restricted in certain areas. As described under 5.1.2, the
V DC started to mediate in the permit procedure. A ll these activities were implemented
before the V LUP was finalized, which was still under approval at the time of research.
No committee member knew what exactly would be included in the plan. Yet it seemed
that the committee ’s only contribution which found its way into the plan was the
se lection of areas for controlled grazing. Future plans of the committee were road
construction and more plantations.
The committee showed satisfaction with the FD ’s support in the process, saying that Fs
and FGs visited the village frequently when nurseries and plantations were started. Yet
many complained that initially, the FD made promises which it was not able to fulfil
now. While many started to realize that the FD would set other priorities, a majority
hoped for a soon improvement of the link road and of other infrastructure.
D aba rga i (Swat) : Ter r itor ia l a nd CDEGD St a f f
The FG in charge of advising the committee on plantations and nurseries said to visit
the village frequently. He complained that the V DC would not be united and would not
work properly. A Forester was of the same opinion, blaming local people for their
indifference towards forest protection and for their mistrust in the department. The RO
in charge did not blame the people but identified structural problems which would
hinder the approach’s success: local residents would not perceive the forest as their
own property yet, thus not rea l izing the problem of deforestation. Without proper
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education, loca l people would never be able to understand the importance of the
process, he said.
The CDO in charge complained that the Territorial Staff would not support him in the
village (compare 5.2). The TS would even hinder him to attend monthly meetings and
would delay payments to the committee for nurseries.19 The overall impression is that
the V LUP process in Dabargai works very slowly and that the TS do not do more than
the absolute minimum.
Shungli (H a z a r a) : VDC members
The V DC Shungli has been constituted in May 2002. Since then, some local residents
could partic ipate in a bee-keeping tra ining, and monthly meetings have been he ld.
Plans for plantations and nurseries have not been realized yet. The committee members
were satisfied with the presence of the TS in their meetings, although the RO would
attend meetings only when the DFO came on a visit. The committee now would have
the possibility to force FD officals to fulfil their duties, by reporting to their superiors
or by seeking the help of the nearby stationed Frontier Constabulary (a detachment of
the Pakistan Army). V DC members knew that their V LUP was under approval at the
time of research, saying that they could contribute by suggesting areas for plantations
and regeneration and by proposing specific trainings.
Many members expressed their hope that the process would help to create new job
opportunities (e.g. guards for plantations) and to reduce i l l ic it cutting in the area.
O thers hoped for the soon real ization of a water supply scheme. Asked whether the
Territorial Staff ’s attitude towards local people changed in the course of the planning
process, nobody observed a true improvement.
Shungli (H a z a r a) : Ter r itor ia l a nd CDEGD St a f f
Most Fs and F Gs sa id to stay in c lose contact with loca l people, by attending a l l
committee meetings and discussing their concerns whenever possible. Some officials
said to be glad that the new approach would henceforth release pressure from their
shoulders. The RO in charge observed that local residents would start to real ize the
importance of forest protection and would give more and more valuable inputs. He was
convinced that it was wise to increase their involvement in forestry: „Local people have
many benefits from the forest – so why should they not face the problems related to it,
too?“
                                                      
19 Suleri (2001, 25) reports similar situations, quoting a V DC member (from another village): „In order to
get the payment for the cost of nursery raised in 1999, I am chasing RO , as well as the DFO concerned
for the last two years but they just treat me as I am asking for alms.”
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The CDO in charge said that local people had been fully involved during the whole
planning process, by preparing land use maps, discussing main points and selecting
activities out of a given ‚ intervention package ’ prepared by the department. He was
happy with the people ’s contribution, saying that they would start to realize the benefits
which would result for them. Thus, none of the vi l lagers seriously resisted the
approach. The only concern he expressed was tha t the commi ttee might ge t
disappointed about the lack of co-operation by the TS.
The following story illustrates very wel l that some officials already found ways to
preserve their influence: a Forest Guard supported the village in which he l ives in
constituting a V DC and a WO (not Shungli , but in the same range). The result is, that
his sister is now secretary of the WO , his cousin president of the V DC .
Participatory observation, however, revealed that the co-operation in Shungli does not
work as we l l as a l l the involved people sa id. The attempt to part ic ipate in the
committee ’s monthly meeting in January 2003 fai led when – apart from one Forest
Guard – neither committee members nor representatives of the FD (including the CDO
in charge) were present at the fixed time. It thus became apparent that a communication
gap exists both within the village and the department, as wel l as between these two
parties.
Meth a l (H a z a r a) : JFMC members
Due to the fact that the V DC in Methal was only recently constituted, the main focus of
research was put on the work of the Joint Forest Management Committee. JFM was
initiated in Methal by the German-funded Siran Forest Development Project (SFDP) in
1995. The committee was inactive for some time when the financial support by SFDP
stopped with the closing of the project. Later on, it was revived by FMC , so that at the
time of research, it consisted of 24 members. The committee now contributes to forest
protection by patrolling regularly in two compartments, and plays a decisive part in the
permit procedure (compare 5.1.2). Two nurseries and plantations have been raised.
Committee members were very satisfied with their achievements, especially with the
permit procedure and the improved protection of their forests. According to a majority
of respondents, the attitude of the Territorial Staff towards local people improved since
the constitution of the JFMC , although their presence in monthly meetings was not
regular. The DFO would visit them every third month. A minority complained that the
TS would continue to oppose the committee, and that outside of the compartments
controlled by the JF M C , bribing and il l ic it cutting would continue. Regarding the
JFMC ’s concentration on forests, committee members expressed their hope that the
recently created V DC would work for the improvement of infrastructure.
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Meth a l (H a z a r a) : Ter r itor ia l a nd CDEGD St a f f
The Range Officer in charge agreed that  the TS changed their attitude towards local
people during the last few years. He was of the opinion that 75% of the whole TS
already adapted to the new situation and thus were considering local people as partners
rather than opponents. He said that he would attend all monthly meetings in Me thal,
while his subordinates would regularly join the committee ’s patrols. The permit
procedure would run smoothly and therefore, much pressure had been released from
the TS. However, some local residents would still be dishonest and would not support
the process. The Forester in charge of Me thal even blamed the committee for
concealing illicit cutting from the FD .
A ll these observations lead to the conclusion that in all study villages, a lot has been
achieved within a short period of time. According to respondents, local committees
were constituted in a participative manner. Nurseries and plantations were raised and
are ma inta ined in most of the places. Even before V il lage Land Use Plans were
approved, areas for controlled grazing have already been selected and are now guarded.
Monthly meetings, in which rather open discussions can take place, are held. Some
people slowly trust in the TS again (mostly in ROs). In general, the process seems to
make people more open towards external actors (compare 5.6.1). Among the TS, a
slow yet certain change of mind can be observed. Whilst the majority of FGs, Fs and
also some ROs sti l l thinks in ‚old terms ’ , some officials seem to arrange themselves
with the new circumstances.20
Neverthe less, genera l problems can be ident i f ied which seem to originate from
structura l shortcomings of the reform process, within the department and the loca l
communities. Even at an early stage already, many committee members were indignant
about the department ’s unwillingness and/or unability to fulfil all the promises made in
the beginning of the V LUP process. To convince people for V LUP, FD officials often
promised better roads, water supply schemes etc. – things that the FD neither has the
knowledge nor the funds for. During the planning phase, many people realized that the
department ’s priority was on forests rather than on infrastructure – while for the
communities, it is often the other way round.
While people could constitute their V DCs themselves, their participation in the plan
preparation seemed to be very weak. When local people can but choose interventions
from a pre-de f ined ‚ intervent ion package ’  and suggest areas for control led
                                                      
20 Suleri (2001, 23) states, that „(...) community members said that they were able to feel a positive
change in the attitudes of F D officials, reveals that things are getting better and through capacity
building of FD territorial staff true spirit of social forestry may be achieved.“
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grazing/plantations, participation is reduced to mere consultation. The fact that all the
V illage Land Use Plans from different vil lages and areas look surprisingly equa l
confirms the impression that these plans are not very much local ly specific. It thus
cannot surprise that some people complained about unprofitable trainings.21
Another problem (that may get solved in the course of time) is that many V DCs could
not find a ‚common sense ’ yet. Different committee members often have completely
different object ives, a lso with regard to a future co-operat ion with the F D . The
contention that in the villages, „a good social cohesion exists“ (V LUP Shungli, 5), thus
seems rather naive.
Likewise, FD officials working with the communities are far from building a ‚ team’ .
While the TS usually blame local people for any setback, the CDEGD field staff put the
blame on Foresters and Forest Guards. This might be the reason for (or the result of)
the observed communication gap between the CDEGD field staff and the TS on the one
hand, and the department and loca l people on the other hand. Under these
c ircumstances, the probabil ity that disappointed committees break off the ir co-
operation with the FD becomes rather high.
5.1.6 Co-operation on Women Organizations (WOs)
Informat ion about the Women Organizat ions ’  performance could only be ga ined
through female CDOs and FFEs. According to them, co-operation proved satisfactory.
The fact that WOs are constituted only after a V DC has been formed would make it
much easier for women to organize themselves, as one female CDO said. Local men
would be much more open towards a women organization after having real ized the
benefits of a V DC . Thus, the resistance among local men would be manageable. In a
few areas only, men would still resist any involvement of women in development work,
accusing the FD of being too modern, thus confronting religion.
One F FE working in Mansehra reported that most women could join a WO only with
the consent of their husbands. She furthermore mentioned that the priorities identified
by a WO often diverged from the priorities identified by the male V DC . A lthough the
aims of both parties are recorded in a common V LUP, none of the plans consulted has
yet solved or even addressed this contradiction (compare also 4.3.4).
                                                      
21 „Most of the V DC members in the project village had attended trainings in the nursery raising, while
WO members had attended trainings in livestock management.  These training were imparted in 1999.
However, the majority of the trainees admitted that they never applied any of the skills learnt in those
trainings in practical life“ (Suleri, 2001, 25).
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5.2 Territorial Staff – CDEGD Staff
5.2.1 De jure co-operation on VLUP / JFM
The most important tasks which the TS and the C D E G D fie ld staff should jointly
implement are as follows:
Territorial Staff CDEGD Staff
All TS keep regular contact with VDCs and
WOs. Generally, the TS has to give more input
than the CDEGD staff .
The DFO  helps by awareness raising and
motivation of com munities, especially in the
beginning of the process.
The RO  coordinates field activities for VLUP, he
should provide technical e x tension in the
beginning of the process and monitor its
im plementation .
Fs and FGs motivate com munities, provide
technical e x tension and create linkages for
VDCs and WOs with other partners.
CDOs and FEEs raise awareness and motivate
com munities for VLUP. Later on they provide
guidance and assistance to com munities in
VLUP, focussing on social organi z ation and
participatory planning . They assist the TS in
their work with com munities, providing
guidance and assistance at all levels in issues
of com munity develop ment and ex tension .
CDOs coordinate field activities, monitor and
evaluate their performance jointly with the TS
and identify training needs.
Female CDOs have to give more input as there
is no female TS.
In other words: TS and C D E G D staf f should joint ly mot iva te and convince
communit ies to const itute committees, providing them soc ia l (C D E G D staff) and
technical suppport (TS). In order to slowly hand over the process to the TS after a
committee is established, the C D E G D staff a lso have to provide guidance and
assistance at all levels of the TS in issues of community development and extension.
FSP documents mention explicitly that the Territorial Staff should give more input than
the CDEGD staff.
5.2.2 De facto co-operation on VLUP / JFM
As the whole V LUP process is still very young, one cannot expect a perfect functioning
of the abovelisted co-operation. Most of the village committees have been constituted
in 2002 only, so that in most areas, the participatory approach is still in an initial stage.
Nevertheless, some problems seem to be of structural nature.
In practice, CDEGD field staff and TS are working in small teams in the villages. In
Swat, such a team consists of each one Range Officer (RO), Community Development
Organizer (CDO), Forester and Forest Guard. Female teams consist of one female CDO
and one or several F FEs. Thus, female CDOs and FFEs are not directly involved with
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„We are asked to initiate a social change within
the Ter ritorial Staff, but that is impossible. It is
already tricky enough to start a social change
within the communities.“
A CD O
the TS, but co-operate with their male CDEGD colleagues (CDOs). This is why mainly
male CDOs could comment the team-work with the Territorial Staff.
CDEGD Field St a f f
The genera l impression is that the C D E G D fie ld staff are not sat isf ied with the
Territoria l Staff ’s performance . Severa l C D Os compla ined that F D off ic ia ls on
different levels would not fulfil their duties. It seems that in many cases, Foresters and
Forest Guards only unwillingly accompany the C D Os to committee meetings. The
compla int was heard that Fs and F Gs would have a complete ly different style of
communicat ion with loca l
people, giving authoritarian
orders rather than trying to
fac i l itate the people ’s own
con t r i bu t i on s .  Som e
C D E G D sta f f fear tha t
people wi l l thus become
disappointed. One CDO said that it was theoretically his task to change the Territorial
Staff ’s attitude towards local people, by training them ‚on the job’ (compare 5.2.1):
„We are asked to init iate a soc ia l change within the Territoria l Staff , but that is
impossible. It is already tricky enough to start a social change within the communities.“
Some C D Os therefore recommend more trainings for the TS, which would prepare
them for the new participatory approach.
Some cases were reported in which ROs or DFOs dealyed payments to V DCs. Money
that should have been transferred to a committee for seedlings (for nurseries maintained
by a committee according to the V illage Land Use Plan) was withheld for a while.
A ccording to another informant , this happened wi th intent to demonstrate the
Territorial Staff ’s authority over the V LUP process.
Own observation revea led that the TS do not a lways fulfi l the ir task to attend the
committees ’ monthly meetings. In several V DC meetings attended both in Swat and
Hazara, representatives of the TS did not show up at al l – and if, mostly after the
meeting was over. The usual excuse was an urgent mission against offenders or a fire in
a remote forest area. As the case may be – repeated complaints of CDEGD staff about
similar incidents confirms the impression that the Territorial Staff often try to avoid
their new tasks.
Ter r itor ia l St a f f
The Territorial Staff describe the situation completely different. A ll Forest Guards and
Foresters involved in V L UP said to attend the V D Cs ’ monthly meetings regularly .
Most of them described the ir role as giving technica l advise on nurseries and
plantations. Some also said to have supported the preparation of the V illage Land Use
Plan or the constitution of the V DC .
General ly, FGs and Fs admitted that these new tasks were an additional burden for
them but that this would not cause further problems. Many said to be positive about the
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„We are not mentally f ree to do that job.“
A Ra nge O fficer
new participatory approach and that they liked to do the job. If something was not
running well in a village, they usually blamed the local people for dishonesty and greed
(compare also 5.1).
Range Officers usually located more and other problems. A lthough they said to attend
meetings whenever possible, they admitted that in the co-operation of CDOs and TS,
not everything was going well. Several ROs pointed out that many FGs and Fs would
fear to lose their influence over their respective area if V LUP would run well. One RO
said that „nobody of the Territorial Staff will ever willingly share his power. Especially
the Forest Guards were real ‚kings’ of their areas.“ The same officer argued that most
of the F Gs and Fs did not
ye t rea l ize tha t the new
pa r t i c i pa tory  approa ch
would rea l ly affect them.
According to him, this was
caused by a poor information policy by the FSP, and a widespread indifference among
the TS. Another RO pointed out that under the current system (in which CDOs are
supervised by ROs or DFOs), CDOs were not able to bring their knowledge and talents
to the process. Concerning the attendance of V DC meetings, al l ROs agreed that in
future, when more committees will be constituted, it would be impossible for the TS to
attend every single meeting. Some suggested to hire other, special ized staff for the
implementation of V LUP.22
5.2.3 Mutual perception and acceptance
To a major extent, the abovementioned problems might result from a communication
gap between the CDEGD staff and the TS. Especially male CDOs felt dismissed by the
TS (compare 2.2). They assumed that this was due to their short-term contracts and
their inexpertness in ‘ technical ’ forestry. Some felt wronged by the fact that a Range
Officer, although ranked in the same grade, would write their A CR. In their daily work,
they perceived most of the TS as acting too authoritative towards local people. A ll
these complaints can also be seen as a result of a certain frustration.23
                                                      
22 Suleri (2001, 23) concludes that „one expects an active involvement of the territorial staff in project
activities.  However, it did not seem to be the case in project villages visited for this study. One can
argue that it was partly due to the fact that training programmes for FD field staff were delayed due to
various organizational reasons and the evolutionary process of institutional reform would not complete
overnight.“
23 Suleri (2001, 24): „The project staff [CDEGD staff] deputed in the DFO offices, on the other hand,
tends to compare itself with the staff serving in DFFW [Forest Department] for years and get frustrated
over the social status and influence the FD staff enjoys.“
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Actual ly, many Forest Guards and Foresters do perceive the CDEGD staff as short-
term partners. Many seem to think  that the ‚ FSP-approach’ (as many of them cal l
V L UP) would consist of nurseries and plantations only. This is especial ly the case
where V LUP was initiated recently. CDOs are thus often perceived as outsiders to the
Forest Department.24
5.2.4 Situation of female CDOs and Female Forest Extensionists
As mentioned earlier, female CDOs and Female Forest Extensionists (F FEs) usual ly
work in a team on the ir own, thus not directly co-operating with the TS. It does
therefore not surprise that they did not complain about the behaviour of the TS. One
FFE said that the only resistance she experienced was from within her own family. A ll
female staff interviewed expressed their satisfaction with the support the received from
their DFOs, both in terms of finances and infrastructure. Due to the fact that all female
respondents have been appointed recently, a comparison with the situation as it was
two years ago (when the first female CDOs were appointed) cannot be made.
However, some respondents reported that among the TS, female CDOs and FFEs were
not accepted very well. Many staff members would be of the opinion that the Forest
Department should not hire women at all.
5.3 Forest Department – Local Government
As Farm Forestry is not a key issue (compare 3.7.3), the
respect ive act ivit ies of the Loca l Government and the
Forest Department have not been investigated. Yet other
forms of co-operation turned out to be more essential for
the decentralization process.
5.3.1 Co-operation of FD with Forest
Protection Committees on district
level
Mingor a  Dist r ict
As a lready ment ioned (4.4), the D istrict Counc i l Mingor a  const ituted a Forest
Protect ion Committee (FPC), consist ing of seven members. The committee holds
regular metings with representatives of the Forest Department, i.e. the DFO Mingora
and Range Officers from Ma t ta  and Mingora Range. Both parties reported fruitful
discussions but complained a lack of decision-making power. A ll they could do was to
                                                      
24 Suleri (2001, 24) states that the TS is „not accepting the new entrants of project staff as their integrated
part and consider them (the project field staff) ‚ too young and inexperienced to tackle the issues of
sustainable forestry management ’ .”
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give suggestions to higher levels of the Forest Department. Both the FPC and the DFO
have neither enough decision-making power nor funds to implement anything. The
DFO nonetheless stressed the necessity of such meetings, although „some committee
members only follow their personal goals and are not honest “, as another official said.
Ma nsehr a  Dist r ict
The situation in Mansehra District is completely different. A lthough a FPC exists on
district level, not a single meeting between FD and committee was held so far. Both
parties know each other but leave it to the other side to initiate the co-operation. A FPC
representative said that the committee would be ready to co-operate, „ if they [the FD]
contact us.“ On the department ’s side, the motivation to establish contact is close to
zero, as is its trust in the committee ’s honesty. FD officials said that some committee
members would be well-known for being deeply involved in timber smuggling.
5.3.2 Other (informal) interaction
On leve ls be low district leve l , forma l co-operation between the F D and the Loca l
Government does not exist. However, in the daily work of the Territorial Staff informal
interactions can take place.
Loca l élites p ressu r iz ing Ter r itor ia l St a f f
It is not unusual that influential people pressurize the TS for various reasons. Several
cases have been reported when Range Officers were put under pressure by – often
rather wealthy and thus influental – local politicians to release arrested offenders, or to
hand out confiscated weapons and other materia l . A  Range O ff icer in Hazara
complained that „the local councillors come all the time to ask for a reduction of fines.“
This seems all the more credible when considering that local élites are often said to be
involved in timber smuggling. Apart from that, they may try to please their voters by
helping them out of troubles.
Union Councillors in loca l com mittees
O ther interaction takes place through V DCs. In some villages, Union Councillors are
members of the V il lage Deve lopment Committee, too. This can result in positive
synergies for the committee ’s work, yet can also lead to internal (within the committee;
see 5.5) and external conflicts (with the Territorial Staff). However, no such conflict
has been reported so far.
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5.4 Local people – Local
Government
5.4.1 Activities of Local Government on
village level
The Loca l Government Plan 2000 intended to link the
Local Government ’s lowest level – the Union Councils –
with the communities through so-called V illage Councils
(V Cs) and Citizen Community Boards (CCBs):
„The Village Council will facilitate citi z en participation to solve their problems. [It] will act as
the m ost direct in terface between the Citi z en Co m m unity Boards and local public officials.
T h e Vi l la g e  C o u nci ls wi l l  u n d er ta k e  t h e ir  f u nct io ns in  close  co-ord in a t io n  wi t h  t h e
m o ni to r in g  co m m it t ees a n d  ci t i z e n  co m m u nity b oards o n  loca l  m a t t e rs a n d  m icro-
develop ment projects.
(. . .) A  local e lected body ,  or i ts relevant co m mittee m ay facili ta te the creation of C it i z en
C o m m u nity Bo ards ,  o r  t h e  ci t i z e ns t h e m se lves m ay crea te  t h e m .  (. . .) As vo lu n tary
organisations the Citi z en Com m unity Boards will organise themselves, determine their own
form of functioning , and choose their own leaders through the mechanisms they see fit .“
Loca l Government Pla n (2000 , 15))
It has been learnt that in practice, none of these bodies exists. Both in Swat and Hazara,
not a single study village constituted such an organization, neither V illage Council nor
C it izen Community Board. Union Nazims of Mingora  D istrict admitted that no
committees on village level were constituted so far. On union level, however, a few
committees exist in which non-councillors are represented, too. The Union Nazim of
Kattai (Hazara) said that he constituted one Citizen Community Board within his union
by selecting himself three to four representatives from every village plus a secretary
and a president. He said that he got an order from the Provincial Government to do so
but never got any funds to maintain the CCB . The way he described the formation of
the Board did not give the impression of a voluntary organisation.
Asked how Union Counci l lors would learn about local people ’s problems, the same
respondent said that suppliants would contact him every now and then. The fact that he
was available „twenty-four hours a day“ in his area would make the Local Government
very responsive towards loca l people. However, during research for this study , the
attempt to meet this Nazim in his vi l lage fa i led severa l t imes due to his non-
availability. The interview was finally conducted in Abbottabad, where he owns several
houses.
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„Our Union Nazim has neither authority nor
money. He has only stamps in his pockets.“
A villager  in Chel, Swat
5.4.2 Perception of Local Government by local people
Asked for their satisfaction with the Local Government, local residents usually express
their deep disappointment. A vast majority of people from many different social classes
both in Swat and Hazara said that most of their hopes for change with the new system
were not fulf i l led. Most people expected investments in infrastructure , e .g. road
levelling or water supply, while only in Methal (Hazara), the Union Council made an
al lowance for repairing a school building. People ’s speculations about why nothing
happens are manifold:
• „The Union Councillors have neither time nor interest to care for people in remote
villages.“
•  „The Council consists of rich people only , so they do not know our problems and
take all the money for themselves.“
• „Every councillor only supports his own village .“
• „They are busy with their own internal conflicts.“
•  „The local councils are good ,  but they do not get the m oney fro m higher levels
such as the Provincial or National Government .“
• „They do not have enough authority to do something .“
In general, the Local Government is blamed for apathy, lack of interest, nepotism and
corruption. In Shungli (Hazara) the story goes that the Union Council drew up a budget
of Rs. 18 lakhs for level l ing a road, from which only 2 lakhs were used effectively,
while the rest disappeared in various pockets. In Me thal, people said that the Union
Council had been inactive for a long time due to an internal conflict about the latest
election procedure of the Union Nazim (a case that was submitted to court). When the
conflict was finally settled, the provincial elections started so that the councillors were
again busy with issues other than local development.
The system as a whole was
also critisised. Higher levels
of the government were
blamed for no t  gi v ing
enough authority and funds to lower levels. In Swat, old people often compared the
current situation with the time when the area was still under the rule of the Wali (until
1969). They all wished that the Wali would return, as everything was much better under
his rule, as they said. Many people expressed their hopes for a change initiated by the
newly elected Provincial Government (the elections took place in October 2002). With
the MM A (Muttahida Majlas-e-Amal , a coalition of religious parties) in power, many
now expect a fight against corruption and nepotism. Nevertheless, some people already
seemed disi l lusioned when after the elections, none of the elected candidates came
back to their villages to realize all the promises made during the election campaign.
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Genera l ly , most people do not hope for he lp from the government anymore. They
real ized that the Local Government has neither sufficient funds nor the will to use
available funds in a proper way. As a result, many villagers said that they would trust
much more in non-governmental organizations (see 5.5).
5.4.3 Union Councillors as members of local committees
The only true – but not institutional ized – l ink between village committees and the
Local Government exists if a counci l lor is elected as a V DC member. In Bar Lalku
(Swat), a Union Councillor was also member of the local V DC . However, this did not
have any negat ive (e .g. dominat ion) or posit ive (e .g. fund ra ising) effect so far,
supposedly due to the fact that the committee was very young at the time of research.
The female CDO in Mingora reported of female councillors being on a WO . Yet she
also said that up to now, no formal l inks between these organizations and the local
councils could be created. In Dabargai (Swat), the V DC president ’s brother is a Union
Councillor – what turned out to be a hindering factor in discussions. When asked for
their satisfaction with the Local Government, other committee members did not dare to
express the ir dissatisfaction in the presence of the ir president – sign of a certa in
domination over the committee by the president.
5.5 NGOs – FD /  local people /  Local Government
Although this study did not concentrate on the non-governmental organizations’ role in
N W FP forest management, some insights in the ir role on loca l leve l and the ir co-
operation with the Forest Department could be gained.
5.5.1 NGOs – local people : activities of NGOs in villages
Only in Shungl i  (Hazara), N G Os seem to play an active part. The ‚Sarhad Rura l
Support Programme ’ (SRSP) helped to build a water supply scheme in some hamlets of
the village. Besides that, the organization offers loans with a smal l interest rate and
planned various trainings. In general, local residents expressed their satisfaction with
the organization’s activities.
Another organization active in Shungli is ‚ Young Generation’ , located in Oghi , which
is about 25 km northeast of Shungli. It is a new, locally funded organization that cares
for the poor and sick people, providing them medical treatment.
Residents of Shungli were very happy with these two organizations – at least happier
than with the Local Government. „They [the NGOs] have less money than the Local
Government, but they are much more effective“ , a respondent said.  In the other study
villages, no organization was active at the time of research. In Dabargai (Swat), K IDP
(see 3.3) funded the construction of a school back in 1997. The example from Shungli
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shows that even in remote villages, NGOs seem to be more accepted and welcomed
than a few years ago.25
5.5.2 Involvement of NGOs in field activities of the Forest
Department
A lthough the Forest Department started to involve more and more N G Os in the
preparation of Operational Plans both in Swat and Hazara, external involvement on
fie ld leve l (i .e. in the implementation of the new partic ipatory approach) rema ined
close to zero. A female CDO in Mingora reported how she sent several young women
from different WOs to computer trainings offered by a local NGO .26 Since the training
was free of cost, all the department had to do was to organize a pick-and-drop service
for the participants. The same CDO intended to involve more NGOs in future, while
her male colleagues in Mingora did not seek the co-operation with any NGO so far. A ll
they did was blaming several organizations for being interested in urban areas only, and
said that the people in charge would prefer to sit in Mingora.
In Hazara, both in Siran and Agror Tanawal Division, no involvement of NGOs in the
V LUP process was observed. However, the CDO in charge of Shungli assured to seek
the ir co-operation soon, espec ia l ly with those who had a lready been active in the
respective villages, e.g. SRSP and ‚ Young Generation’ .
5.5.3 Co-operation between the Local Government and NGOs
The relation between the state and civil society organizations is a very delicate one in
the N W FP. Statements of the new provinc ia l government give the impression that
NGOs are considered as a threat rather than as partners. It thus should not surprise that
a co-operation between the Local Government and NGOs in Swat does not exist at all.
When asked for reasons, District Councillors said that in Swat, no NGOs specialized on
rura l areas would be ava i lable. In Hazara, some co-operation takes place, yet not
related to forest management. The Union Nazim of Kattai (Hazara) was contacted by
the Sarhad Rural Support Project (SRSP) to jointly improve infrastructure in the area.
Besides that, ‚Sungi ’ seems to be in contact with the District Council, yet details on this
co-operation are not known.
                                                      
25 Suleri (2001, 29) argues that, „another positive contribution of V DCs/WOs is the acceptance of CBOs
and NGOs in the rural areas of NW FP. (...) with the introduction of social forestry approach, the
community members are much open to external interventions (...)“.
26 The NGO’s abbreviation is PV DP.
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6 Analysis
This section presents the core problems identified by the study. The same stakeholder
groups as presented in sections 4 and 5 are listed again.
6.1 Territorial Staff of the Forest Department
Gap between defined a nd p r acticed role
Obviously, the de facto role of Forest Guards, Foresters and Range Officers differs
wide ly from the ir de jure role as defined in the legal framework for the Territorial
Staff. Depending on the situation, existing laws are interpreted differently, modified or
even ignored. Examples discussed in this study (e.g. on fining offenders or the use of
weapons) showed that this was not only due to a non- or misunderstanding of the rules,
but is a lso done will ingly , in order to ga in persona l – often financ ia l – benefits.
However, discussion pointed out that difficult personal and professional circumstances
often force F D offic ia ls to ignore the law in order to earn the ir l ive l ihoods or, if
threatened by criminals, to save their l ives.  It is an open secret that corruption and
nepotism are widespread within the FD . Yet being realistic, such phenomenons must be
seen as unavoidable concomitants of the current fie ld rea l ities. Forest Guards and
Foresters receive very low salaries even after many years on duty, while their job offers
them numerous informa l opportunities of earning additiona l income. When control
mechanisms for the TS hardly exist or do not work properly (if the superior is involved
in informal activities, too, or is too weak to enforce the law), cheating becomes very
easy.
More t asks, less f acilit ies /  lack of incentives for  VLUP /  JFM
Many FD officials on field level complain that in recent years, their duties increased
very much while faci l ities and salaries remained the same. Besides their traditional
duties to secure forest protection, the additional task of V LUP asks too much of many
FD officials, so that their motivation to give a real input to the V LUP approach is very
weak . Thus, the ir re jection of the new partic ipatory approach seems based on two
reasons:
F irst, many (but by far not a l l) F Gs, Fs and a lso ROs fee l threatened by the new
approach. They soon realized that if the communities are given more responsibility and
control over forest-related issues, this would impair their own powers and put them
under a certain control by the local population. Translated into practice, this would
mean that opportunities to bypass the law and thus earn additional income would be
reduced.
Second, few incentives only were offered by the FD to motivate the TS for the new
approach. Trainings in social organization for Fs and FGs certainly help to improve the
V LUP approach, yet might hardly substitute any lost opportunity of informal earning.
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In addition, the FD did not find a way yet to appreciate committed staff. Whether or not
a Forester fulfills his job seriously, has no impact on his salary, as he is assessed by the
traditiona l ‚ Annua l Confidentia l Report ’ , which hardly takes into account persona l
committment going beyond prescribed duties. A Range Officer described the situation
as follows: „Those who are doing more, get less. Those who are doing less, get more.“
Cont r adiction of the Forest O rdin a nce 2002 a nd the FSP approach
The roles defined for the TS by the Forest Ordinance 2002 on the one hand and the FSP
approach on the other hand, are completely inconcistent with one another. While the
Ordinance turns the TS into a ‚ Forest Force ’ with more powers than ever (e.g. the use
of weapons in certain cases), the FSP approach wants to bring the TS closer to the local
population. While the Ordinance – which was highly welcomed by most FD officials –
reproduces the department ’s traditional (some say ‚colonial ’) approach, regarding local
people as being a threat to forests, the FSP’s objective is to vest them with decision-
making powers with regard to forest management. This does not mean that the new
Ordinance is not necessary , since widespread smuggling and other forms of i l l ic it
cutting have shown the urgent need for a strict law enforcement. Yet combined with the
FSP approach, it demands from the Territorial Staff to play a double-part which is very
difficult – if not impossible – to fulfil.
Veteran FD officials seem particularly affected by this, as they show more difficulties
in adapting themselves to such new challenges. A DFO put it like that: „My field staff
are still thinking in the old ways of protection. It is very difficult to change the point of
view of an old Forest Guard who served for more than twenty years. But if we do not
change , how can the communit ies change?“ Another D F O pointed out the same
difficulties, saying that he would prefer if the two tasks of protection and participation
were separated from each other
Impression of being ignored by a  top-down , un rea listic refor m
Many Forest Guards and Foresters said that they were never contacted by FSP so far.
Ne ither did FSP ask for the ir opinion about the new structure of the F D and the ir
professional future, nor were they ever invited for trainings on the new approach. Such
statements might sometimes serve as a welcomed excuse for avoiding new tasks, yet
they above all disclose the Territorial Staff ’s reservations against FSP. Up to DFO level
(and most probably even higher up), many officials consider FSP experts as outsiders,
who would be unaware of the ‚ field realities’ , while sitting in far-away Peshawar. In
consideraton of that, FSP’s initial decision to ignore the Territorial Staff might have
been a mistake, certainly reinforcing the widespread opinion among the TS that FSP
was but an abstract and temporary project that could be ignored, too. Unfortunately, the
latest news on FSP seem to confirm the TS in their opinion (compare 3.5.4).
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6.2 Territorial Staff – CDEGD Field Staff
TS perceive CDEGD field st a f f as tempor a ry
Due to the Territorial Staff ’s abovementioned perception of FSP, many Forest Guards
and Foresters regard the CDEGD field staff as being a temporary phenomenon. This
does nor surprise, as most CDEGD officials are hired on short-term contracts, often for
not more than three months. Consequently (and because they are not professiona l
foresters), C D Os fee l dismissed and compla in insecure working condit ions. This
certainly hampers their motivation to do a good job.
Com munica tion gap a nd lack of tea m-work
The FSP approach requires that CDEGD field staff and TS would join in teams in order
to work with local committees. De jure, the Territorial Staff were required to give the
major input in these teams, while CDOs would facilitate the process and support the TS
only if necessary. De facto, however, the CDEGD field staff are giving the major input
in V LUP activities, while the support by the TS is often insufficient. Suleri (2001, 23)
comes to the same conc lusion: “FSP soc ia l organizers [=C D E G D fie ld staff] are
appointed for fac i l itation in preparation of first three V L UPs in an RMS (then the
process would be handed over to FD staff, and later on to the partner NGOs identified
for this purpose). Thus ideally the Territorial Staff should avail the guidance available
through FSP staff for V LUP preparation. However, it was realized that it is the project
staff that interacts with V DC members the most.”
CDEGD officials not only complain of a communication gap between them and the TS,
but also say that the TS would often try to obstruct the process by refusing to support
V LUP activities. Possible reasons for this attitude have been given above.
CDEGD field st a f f a re completely dependent on higher  of fici a ls of the TS
Although ranked on grade 16 (and thus on the same level as a Range Officer), a CDO’s
range of act ion is often very much dependent on the respect ive D F O or RO . In
principle, C D E G D officials are subordinate to their own directorate, while in dai ly
work , they are under the control of the ir D F O . If a D F O is convinced of the FSP
approach and if is willing to spare his time on the activities of CDOs and FFEs, this can
be a fruitful co-operation. If not, it can seriously affect the CDO ’s performance and
motivation. Whether a C D O gets a car when going to the f ie ld, or T A /D A when
attending a workshop in Peshawar, is up to the DFO . A ll this would not be so grave if
D F Os and ROs would not assess the ir respective C D Os and F F Es through Annua l
Confident ia l Reports, which dec ide about the cont inuat ion of the ir (short-term)
contracts. Consequently , C D Os and F F Es hardly ever dare to compla in about the ir
working environment, since they would risk to lose their job. For instance, one case
was reported when a DFO who used an official car for private purpose, forced a CDO
to sign the faked car logbook.
Analysis
81
A ll this hampers the motivation of the CDEGD field staff, and does not allow them to
give their best attention to the V LUP activities, as their decision-making powers are
often reduced to a minium.
6.3 Territorial Staff – local people : general relations
Per mit p rocedure as m a jor  p roblem
The permit procedure (application for an offic ia l permit for the fe l l ing and use of
timber for local consumption) turned out to be a permanent matter of discussions in all
study villages. In many places, people do not apply anymore as they would never be
considered, as they said. Many among those sti l l applying in a legal way expressed
the ir disappointment about the complicated and lengthy procedure . People often
blamed the department for de laying the application process will ingly , saying that
permits would hardly ever be issued without a bribe.
Representatives of the Territorial Staff strongly denied that, saying that permits would
be issued as quick as possible . They ment ioned that people would often submit
insufficient applications, thus causing complications. A ll in al l, the permit procedure
appears as a ma jor source of quarre l and dissatisafction between the TS and loca l
people. Only In Methal village, a new procedure was introduced which satisfies both
parties.
People’s accepta nce of FD depending on ci rcumsta nces
It was learnt that the department ’s authority among local people is very ambivalent.
Especially in Protected Forests, hardly anybody accepts the state as the legal owner of
forests. Owners of shares in the forest perceive themselves as the only landowners,
denying any rights and powers of the department. This attitude (‚Why should we ask
the department, if this is our forest?’) explains why many owners of shares do never
apply for a permit. If people get caught while illegally cutting timber, FD officials are
often considered as a ‚necessary evil ’ . The fact that many officials are ready to take
bribes instead of imposing lega l ly de f ined f ines futhermore undermines the
department ’s weak authority.
In other cases, however, even owners of shares accept the authority of the Territorial
Staff. If a conflict about forest resources cannot be solved local ly, the FD  is often
asked for help. A case has been observed in Swat, when shareholders asked a Forester
to trounce their tenants who cut timber without asking for permission. They were afraid
of the offenders and did not dare to meet them, so only after intense discussions, the
complainants agreed to accompany the Forester. The example shows that local people
accept the authority of the FD only if its enforcement results in a benefit for them. They
are well aware that in other situations, the TS are too weak or not willing to enforce the
law, so that their authority can be ignored without taking much risk.
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TS a nd loca l people sh ape rules jointly on the spot
It was often heard that offenders were released after paying a certain amount on the
spot to the respective F D offic ia l . It seems that none of these amounts was ever
registered in the legal way. Some people were freed after giving a certain amount of
timber to the respective official. Many said that the amount of a bribe would depend on
the personal relationship between the offender and the official.
The Territorial Staff denies such practices. Yet as many Foresters and Forest Guards
vary wide ly in the ir explanat ions how to handle offenders and impose f ines, the
impression arises that they often follow their own rules. While it is difficult to quantify
the commonness of such practice, it must also be stressed that there might be many
officials who enforce the law correctly. However, even if a small minority only ignores
rules and regulations, such behaviour undermines the department ’s authority , and
seriously obstructs its credibility regarding V LUP. How can local people accept the FD
as a serious partner in V LUP, if they know the ‘ field realities’?
The same apllies to smuggling activities. Supposedly, some FD officials in different
areas are directly involved in smuggling, either by not hindering such activities or by
supporting them actively. It thus can happen that the same official works with local
people in V il lage Land Use Planning and forest protection in the daytime, while
actively damaging the resource base through smuggling at night.
6.4 Territorial Staff / CDEGD Field Staff – local people:
VLUP / JFM
One cannot expect that the new co-operation on V LUP runs smoothly after such a short
time. Nonetheless, several structural problems make successful V LUP impossible.
Com munica tion gap between com mittees a nd the FD
Besides a communication gap between the CDEGD field staff and the TS (compare
above), there is also some sort of communication gap between local committees and the
FD officials in charge of V LUP. It is obviously that communication can be difficult in
remote areas such as the ones examined. However, if a monthly meeting fai ls only
because neither FD officials nor local residents make any effort to confirm the date in
advance (described earlier in this report), the V LUP process seems seriously damaged
by a lack of proper communication and motivation.
Doubts of pa r ticipa tion on VLUP prepa r a tion
Doubts must be raised on the extent of people ’s participation in the preparation of
V i l lage Land Use Plans. A l though C D Os and F F Es sa id that many different
participative tools were applied in the planning process, most plans look surprisingly
equal. This identicalness might result from the predefined ‘ intervention package ’ , from
which loca l people are asked to choose some interventions, and which reduces a
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committee ’s range of action from the very beginning. Another reason might be that
many CDOs – who are responsible for finalization of the plans – are overburdened with
work and resort to ‘copy-paste ’ working methods. Anyway, the quality of the plans can
lead to complaints from local side, when trainings offered by the FD are of no avail for
improving local l ivel ihoods. Many respondents who had already attended a training
said that they never could apply any of the skills learnt, and raised doubts about the
usefulness of V LUP.
FD r a ises (too) high expect a tions a nd h as other  p r ior ities th a n loca l people
Another source of dissatisfaction among committee members is that many of them
joined the V DC under false assumptions. A new road to the village, a water supply
scheme, a functioning school system – such were the expectations that many local
residents had from the new approach. Meanwhile they rea l ized that V L UP ma inly
concentrates on forest protection and afforestation measures, and that infrastructure
interventions are of secondary importance only. The lack of clean drinking water or the
absence of a road are problems which manifest themse lves every day , whi le
deforestation might cause trouble after ten to fifteen years only. Thus, V LUP fell short
of many people ’s expectations.
This does not mean that forest protection was not an urgent issue. However, it seems
that F D offic ia ls enlisted loca l people for V L UP by ra ising fa lse hope, which the
department is not able to fulfil, as it has neither the capacity nor the funds to do so. Yet
it can be assumed that local people also raise illusions on their own, hoping that the FD
would solve al l their problems. Be that as it may – the current situation entai ls the
possibility that many people turn away from the process soon. This would weaken the
loca l support for V D Cs and W Os (a support that was st i l l strong at the t ime of
research).
Prior ities of WOs a nd VDCs often dif fer
Nearly all V illage Land Use Plans consulted showed that priorities for development of
Women Organization and V illlage Development Committee differ. While women often
prioritize access to clean drinking water, the male V DC often wants to concentrate on
road improvement. A CDO in Hazara confirmed these differences, but also said that
only local people themselves would be able to solve them.
Com mittees a re often not united /  D a nger of élite domin a tion
“A good social cohesion exists. In addition, same socio-economic conditions prevail in
the village, which can be termed as classless. This will further contribute to good social
cohesion.” (V LUP Shungli, 5) Data collection for this study revealed that there is a
difference between the opinion of a gathered commitee and the opinions of its
individual members. It could be observed that, when asked in privacy, V DC members
differed widely in their opinions about what the committee should do in future. In Bar
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Lalku (Swat), some members were convinced that the V DC could only survive with a
c lose co-operat ion with the F D , while others categorica l ly ruled out such a co-
operation. Similar trends could be observed in other places.
It is only natural that a committee takes some time to develop a ‘common sense ’ . Yet
the example also shows that a committee ’s official opinion can be dominated by a
powerful minority. In a committee meeting in Dabargai (Swat), hardly anybody else
than the V DC president rose to speak. When a question about the Local Government ’s
performance arose, nobody dared to say a word because the president ’s brother was a
Union Counci l lor. It it therefore understandable if non-members blame the V DC for
working for rich people only. Suleri (2001, 25) points into the same direction: “The
main challenge for FSP is to involve all sections of the village community to work for
sustainable natural resources management, leading to sustainable development of the
area. Land tenure system, however, is one of the major hurdles in equitable distribution
of the benefits arising out of the project activities, espec ia l ly where the lands (or
hillsides) are privately owned.”
6.5 Forest Department – Local Government
H a z a r a : lack of t rust
O ther than in Swat, where FD and District Council hold regular meetings (see below),
no effort has yet been made to establish contact in Hazara. A lthough both parties
stressed the importance of mutua l understanding and co-operation, ne ither of them
seemed willing to do the first step. This has to do with the composition of the Forest
Protection Committee, that consists of rich Guzara owners only, out of which some are
suspected of timber smuggling. Under these circumstances, co-operation on district
level does not seem realistic at present.
Co-oper a tion in Swat is very much limited
The regular meetings held in Swat are working, but the range of possibilities is very
narrow. The forum has neither the decision-making power nor the funds required to
implement anything. It can only raise ideas and bring them forward to higher levels of
the FD .
For m al links only on Dist r ict level
The regular meetings he ld between F D offic ia ls and representatives of the D istrict
Council Forest Protection Committee are the only institutionalized link between the FD
and the Local Government. On lower levels such as tehsi l and union, no formal co-
operation was reported (and is a lso not foreseen in the Loca l Government Plan).
Unfortunately, the few informal links that exist did not yet show any results. However,
the fact that many ma le and fema le Union Counc i l lors are on a V D C or W O is a
promising opportunity for the future. Through such links, loca l counc i ls could be
informed about the committees’ activities, or funds could be raised.
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D a nger of pa r a llel institutions: VDC /WO a nd VC / CCB (compa re 5 .4 .1)
The objectives of V illage Councils and Citizen Community Boards – the two political
bodies foreseen in the Local Government Plan 2000 for the village level  – are nearly
congruent with those of the existing V DCs and WOs (to initiate developmental work
on local level in a participative manner). A lthough at the time of research, neither V Cs
nor C C Bs existed in the visited areas, the ir format ion would only unnecessari ly
compete with already existing committees. The most promising approach would be to
merge the two ideas and fulfil the aims of both parties – government and FD – with the
exist ing, but strenghtened commi ttees. A  forma l l ink be tween F D and Loca l
Government on village level would be a welcomed side effect.
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7 Conclusions and recommendations
This section evaluates the ongoing decentralization process by applying the criterias for
decentralization, established in section 2. thus Thus, the reform’s main strengths and
weaknesses are pointed out. A subsequent part comes up with recommendations on
how the core problems and bottlenecks identif ied for the reform process and the
V LUP/JFM process in particular could be tackled.
7.1 Evaluation of the decentralization process
Criteria 1: Work with local democratic and accountable institutions
Loca l com mittees (VLUP /  JFM)
Committees are elected in a resonably democratic procedure, and represent most of a
village ’s khels. Usually, rich and poor, rightholders and non-rightholders (in Protected
Forests), owners and non-owners (in Reserved and Guzara Forests) build a committee.
However, a democrat ic format ion does not necessari ly ant ic ipate a committee ’s
domination through local élites. Yet this is rather a problem of democracy itself than of
the examined approaches.
V DCs and JFMCs can be cal led accountable towards their communities. Committee
meetings are open to non-members, so that outsiders can check its activities and raise
their voice as wel l. Nonetheless, communication problems between a committee and
the rest of the community were observed in many of the study villages. This can be
caused by a bad information policy of the committee itself, or by a lack of interest of
non-members.27
Without doubt, linking local committees with local government bodies would increase
the committees’ legitimation and accountability. Such links would be in the sense of
Ribot (2002), too, who prefers local bodies which are part of a government structure
instead locally initiated bodies.
Criteria 2: Transfer sufficient and appropriate powers and funds
Intern a l p rocesses (TS, CDEGD sta f f)
The reform process conferred many new tasks, but hardly any additiona l dec ision-
making power upon the Territoria l Staff . G iving technica l assistance in the V L UP
process does not require important individual decisions, especial ly not on financial
issues. Only the Forest Ordinance 2002 vested the TS with some new police powers
(e.g. use of firearms).
                                                      
27 Because most committees have been very young at the time of research, a true evaluation of this
criteria is not possible yet.
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The same applies for the CDEGD field staff. A lthough the V LUP process assigns a
vital role to CDOs and FFEs, they can hardly ever decide about the co-operation with
local committees. Important operational and financial decisions remained with higher
officials such as ROs or DFOs, so that even short field trips of CDOs can be cancelled
anytime by a DFO .
Loca l com mittees (VLUP /  JFM)
V DCs have only very limited decision-making power over operational and financial
planning. The V LUP process is very much predetermined, not allowing local people to
realize their very own ideas. In the planning process, committee members can only help
to collect village data and can suggest some minor interventions. Many committees
learn about the full content of ‘ their’ plan only after its approval by the FD .
The situation of JFMCs is somehow better. In Me thal, where the only efficient JFM
committee exists, local people can exert influence both through the permit procedure
and through local forest patrols. Since collected fines go into a joint account by the
committee and the FD , local people are endowed with the possibility to control such
funds.
Criteria 3: Transfer powers as secure rights
Intern a l p rocesses (TS, CDEGD sta f f)
It is often up to ROs or DFOs whether lower staff can play a part in the V LUP process.
A lthough the rules and regulations de jure secure the powers of a CDO , they are de
facto often with his superiors. The implementation of the reform process on local level
thus very often depends on the will of a few individuals. If a DFO is in favour of the
new participatory approaches, he can support his staff very well; if he wants to obstruct
the reforms, he can easi ly stop the process in his area. As long as such arbitrariness
exists, none of the devolved powers are secured.
In addition, most of the CDEGD field staff are working on a short-term contract basis.
DFOs and ROs can exert most influence on these contracts by assessing the CDEGD
staff through Annual Confidential Reports. CDOs and FFEs are therefore confronted
with very insecure working condit ions, as they are highly dependent upon the ir
superiors not only with regard to V LUP activities, but also for their own professional
future.
Loca l com mittees (VLUP /  JFM)
The few powers given to local committees are not secured at all. The V LUP agreement
signed between the FD and a committee can be terminated nearly arbitrarily by the
department. Possible reasons for cancellation are if “the V DC fails to act according to
the principles of V LUP”, or if the department is not “ in a position to fulfil the financial
obligations forthcoming from this agreement” (V LUP Chel, 30). Contrary to this, the
committee has no possibility to cance l the agreement if the F D does not fulfi l the
obligations agreed upon.
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Criteria 4: Supprt equity and justice and establish fair and accessible adjudication
Intern a l p rocesses (TS, CDEGD sta f f)
On the department ’s local levels, equity can not be guaranteed yet. The CDEGD field
staff are disadvantaged in severa l ways. F irst, they are hardly accepted by the TS;
second, their working conditions are much worse than those of the TS (no long-term
contracts); third, they are considered by most other officials as temporary staff only.
The upper levels of the CDEGD directorate did not take any measures to strengthen the
position of their field staff so far, so that CDOs and FFEs are further subject to the will
of DFOs and ROs. Due to a lack of experience, CDOs and FFEs hardly ever succeed to
make use of informal networks, which al low the TS to generate additional income.
A lthough the reforms are not to be blamed for that, some CDOs get frustrated by the
fact that many of their colleagues earn several thousand Rupees more every month.
Third parties have hardly been involved so far. A t the time of research, no NGO was
involved to support the TS and the CDEGD staff in V LUP activities.
Loca l com mittees (VLUP /  JFM)
In principle, equity within local committees is guaranteed by a democratic election
procedure, which is supervised by the FD . However, local élites can capture the process
and dominate a committee. Often, an influential and rich man is elected as president of
a committee (e.g. V DC Dabargai), or, if the presidency is with a representative of a
smaller khe l , the V DC secretary dominates the process (e.g. V DC Timri). CDOs have
only l imited influence on such processes, and since rich people are often good
communicators, they can also control the contact between the committee and the FD .
Third parties such as NGOs do not play a part yet in local V LUP or JFM activities.
Even where NGOs are locally active and accepted (e.g. Shungli), they have not been
involved in the process yet. Several CDOs and FFEs affirmed their intention to seek
contact with such organizations but did not realize it so far. Due to the fact that local
committees are not officially linked with the Local Government, no third party exists
which could act as an independent channel of appeal for local committees. Thus, the
ombudsman – instal led on district level in the course of the Local Government Plan
2000 – is not responsible for the V LUP process.
Criteria 5: Establish minimum environmental standards
Loca l com mittees (VLUP /  JFM)
The V L UP procedure def ines more organizat iona l and soc ia l than environmenta l
standards. Every V illage Land Use Plan mentions these ‘principles of V LUP’ , which
define the participation of minorities, an integrative approach for the whole village
area, and the active partic ipation of women in the process. Moreover, every plan
formulates the obligations for both the V DC and the FD . For the local committee, the
obligations are: restore and ma inta in vegetation cover; open a joint bank account
together with the FD; collect financial or physical contributions for the V LUP activities
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in the vil lage; keep proper records; keep the F D informed about a l l meetings etc.
(V LUP Chel, 29). Thus, ‘restore and maintain vegetation cover’ is the only obligation
dealing with environmental quality. However, its blurry formulation does not allow to
apply it as a criteria for measuring the co-operation’s success or sustainability.
The plans also formulate the objectives of the joint activities for the plan period, e.g.
500 acres of plantations, 360’000 seedlings distributed, five herdsmen hired etc. It is
mentioned that the FD and the committee will monitor the proceedings jointly. “Annual
progress will be reviewed (…) [and the] plan be revised.” (V LUP Chel, 28). Yet no
plan defines the measures to be taken if the objectives are not met within the given
time. The objectives and obligations can therefore not serve as standards which would
provide clear guidelines – they rather give a free hand to the FD to intervene whenever
wanted.
Criteria 6: Support education and information
Intern a l p rocesses (TS, CDEGD field st a f f)
The Territorial Staff has not been sufficiently informed about the ongoing reform, its
implications on field level, and the new V LUP approach. Many officials were never
briefed, while others received basic trainings on developing social skills for V LUP. A ll
in all, the FD (and FSP in particular) has no institutionalized ‘ information policy’ for
its lower levels. This resulted in a rather unclear and often wrong impression about the
reform among the ground level staff. Most Foresters and Forest Guards are much better
informed about the content of the Forest Ordinance 2002 – a lbe it many different
interpretations about its practical use exist. The fact that the TS are not informed in a
transparent way allows them to avoid new responsibilities, using the simple excuse that
nobody told them to do so.
The CDEGD field staff are generally better informed. A ll interviewed CDOs and FFEs
rece ived an initia l tra ining on objectives and methodologies of the new approach.
Contrary to the TS, these people were exclusively hired for implementing V LUP.
Loca l com mittees (VLUP /  JFM)
The information flow between the F D and loca l committees is not suffic ient. The
impression could be gained that in the initial phase of a V LUP procedure – when local
residents are informed about the approach – the department does not openly inform
about its own priorities. It can thus not surprise that some committee members got
disappointed about the committee ’s achievements, when they rea l ized that the F D
prioritized nurseries and plantations rather than community infrastructure.
Village Land Use Plans are initially written in English, and only later on translated into
the local language. V D C members thus often lack important information about the
plan, and can check it only after approval by the FD . It is therefore of little use only if
objectives and obligations are clearly mentioned in every plan.
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Criteria 7: Organi z ational models should be locally specific
Intern a l p rocesses (TS, CDEGD field st a f f)
Due to organizat iona l logic and financ ia l constra ints, the department cannot be
expected to establish different organizational models for every particular location. The
new setup of the FD , with four specialized directorates supporting the Territorial Staff
and covering a l l different aspects of modern forestry , seems we l l considered and
flexible enough to tackle varying local circumstances. The only problem is that the
framework does not leave much space for individua l dec isions, so that even the
CDEGD field staff must work according to rather stiff procedures. A highly flexible
system would be able to hire spec ia l ized staff upon requirement, yet budgetary
constraints do not allow that at the moment.
Last but not least, the decentral ization process did not succeed yet in removing the
department ’s strong hierarchical (or colonial) structure. Superiors are still very much
feared, and there is hardly any possibility for the field staff work to their way up.
Consequently, local working practices are still characterized by hierarchical relations
rather than by horizontal, more flexible interactions, as foreseen by the reform.
Loca l com mittees (VLUP /  JFM)
As mentioned above, V LUP activities are often very schematic. Comparing several
V illage Land Use Plans from different areas leads to the impression of a ‘copy-paste ’
working style, since most plans look surprisingly equal. Whether or not a village is
remote, whether it is located in protected or reserved forests, whether in Hazara or Swat
– all plans define the same aims, objectives and interventions. This is certainly caused
by the common practice of presenting a given intervention package, out of which the
committee is asked to select a few interventions. Such practice leaves hardly any space
for local demands and ideas, so that many people in different areas complained the
non-usefulness of the  trainings they attended.
Only the Forest Protection Committee and FD officials in Swat developed some locally
specific solutions (compare 5.3.1). So much the worse is it that this kind of promising
local co-operation receives neither financial nor logistical support from Peshawar.
7.2 Final conclusions
In order to formulate the overall findings of this study, the main hypothesis, which has
been formulated in the beginning of this study and which guided the research, shall be
considered again:
O n local level ,  a  b ig  gap e x ists be tween de jure an d de facto forestry .  T here fore ,  the
ongoing reform process can not be called a true decentrali z ation yet .
Considering the preceding sect ions and the eva luat ion done in sect ion 7.1, the
hypothesis can be verified. The major differences between the legal framework for
forestry and its arbitrary interpretation and non-observance on local level cleary show
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that there is a considerable gap between de jure and de facto situation. However, its is
impossible to describe the one and only de facto situation – as numerous the different
individuals working in the department are, so numerous are the de facto situations.
Range Officers, Foresters and Forest Guards have their own individual practices in
order to tackle the daily challenges they get confronted with, and every new situation
requires new responses. In this sense, forestry as it is practised in the field can be seen
as a very creative procedure, which tries to find appropriate solutions to local and very
specific problems. Such problems also include the difficult circumstances in which
these officials operate, and which sometimes force them to ignore existing rules. In
order to supplement their often meager salaries, to feed their families, or to save their
own life when being threatened by criminals, their often only choice is to find informal
solutions. Thus, their rather bad image as acting arbitrarily and maliciously, should at
least partly be revised. However, one must not forget that such practice does not
correspond to the law and makes sustainable forest management impossible.
Severa l criterias of decentra l ized systems have not been fulfi l led at the t ime of
research. A lthough the V il lage Land Use Planning process succeeded to establish
resonably democratic committees representing a useful basis for further co-operation
between the Forest Department and local people, most other criterias are met partly
only.
Within the department, few powers only were devolved to lower levels of the (still very
strong) hierarchy . K ey dec isions concerning loca l act ivit ies rema in with higher
offic ia ls. Consequently , it is them who influences the extent to which the V L UP
approach becomes realized in the field. Most of the powers devolved to the lower staff
are therefore not secure. Officials who can be sacked anytime by their superior will not
dare to make use of their new decision-making powers, especially not if the superior is
known to disfavour the new approach.
A t the time of research, the information flow within the department was insufficient.
Most foresters and forest guards were never officially informed about the department ’s
reforms, their new tasks with V LUP, or the role of their new teammates, the CDEGD
field staff. However, this problem has been recognized by the planning level by the end
of 2002, and necessary measures (workshops for foresters and forest guards) are
considered. Last but not least, the V LUP approach, which proved to be very promising,
is applied too systematically. A lthough V LUP would allow locally specific solutions,
all the committees examined ‘decided’ to take the same measures in order to solve their
problems. Both in Hazara and Swat, plans are as like as two peas in a pod, indicating a
lack of creativity and room for action on local level.
What the NWFP Forest Department calls a decentralization should therefore rather be
termed as a deconcentration – according to the definitions given in section 2.2, shifting
of workload, func t ions and some compe tences to lower sta f f are the ma in
characteristics of a deconcentration (or administrative decentralization). Agrawal and
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Ostrom (1999, 76) ca l l this process “perhaps the most innocuous of the forms of
decentralization”.
7.3 Recommendations
This section tries to translate some of the abovementioned findings into practice.
A lthough it is very difficult to ‘change the wheels on a running train’ (or to reform a
department while it should continue to work), a number of practicable interventions can
be recommended. If the current reform should succeed in future, some of them will be
inevitable.
7.3.1 Territorial Staff of the Forest Department
Crea te incentives for  the implementa tion of VLUP/JFM approaches
„Those who are doing more, get less. Those who are doing less, get more.“ (compare
4.1). Currently it is not the performance of a subordinate that counts, but his loyality
towards his superiors. Respecting the department ’s strictly hierarchical structure gets
rewarded, while showing persona l init iat ive and taking risks in order to improve
existing procedures is not welcomed. The Annual Confidential Report (A CR) embodies
this system, although it has no influence on the staff ’s salary (which cannot be raised
by any means but the annual, fixed increment). Thus, a more dynamic way of staff
assessment, including efficiency wages for officials who show a vivid interest to fulfil
their tasks properly, should be considered. Officials working well with the communities
could be f inanc ia l ly rewarded, what in turn would decrease the ir dependency on
informal ways of earning. “Merits such as creative problem-solving, honesty, and field-
based achievements must drive the incentive system, rather than seniority or politics.”
(Poffenberger 1996, 10)
Trainings offered to the TS as an incentive will only have limited effects. Due to their
low salaries, most of the Forest Guards, Foresters and Range Officers urgently need the
money they can earn by informal means. Nevertheless, trainings are crucial in order to
prepare the staff for the new tasks, obligations and powers they receive in the course of
the whole reform. Poffenberger (1996, 235) writes: “Without guidance through formal
and in-service training, forestry staff were unable to respond to the changing needs of
the forest department or the needs of participating forest communities.”
Besides ef f ic iency wages, other forms of addi t iona l lega l incomes should be
considered. Rewards for catching offenders should be raised (giving a bigger share to
lower staff levels). O therwise, taking bribes instead of imposing legal fines remains
much more attractive.
Reduce workload by seeking co-oper a tion of loca l NGOs
Many new tasks were fathered on the Territoria l Staff since the FSP approach is
pract iced. V L UP act iv i t ies are t ime-intensive , espec ia l ly when commi ttees are
constituted and technical advice has to be given. Even when this initial phase is over,
and the CDEGD field staff is expected to reduce their contribution towards V LUP, the
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TS remains busy with community work. In order to reduce the Territorial Staff ’s tasks
it would thus make sense to seek the co-operation of loca l N G Os. Organizations
already active in a respective village should be involved in V L UP/JF M . Moreover,
NGOs can also act as mediators, helping to solve potential conflicts between the FD
and local committees.
That this can happen, the state has to revise its percept ion of N G Os as possible
opponents and notorious critics. Nevertheless, potential partners should be selected
with care. NGOs can only assist, not replace the Territorial Staff in V LUP – as it is
important that the TS remains involved both in protective and participative activities.
O therwise, the same old practices as described by this study will continue to obstruct
the FSP approach. Poffenberger (1996, 219) comes to the same conclusion for Indian
forestry, advising that “since the government is not in a position to hire new staff [the
same applies for the NWFP], it may be better to adjust the workload (…) by obtaining
NGO help to cover areas under joint management.”
Institution a lize in for m a tion ch a nnels within the Forest Depa r tment
Involving lower staff levels in the reform discussion seems an absolutely necessity.
A fter a l l , some TS have recently been involved in discussing the ir own new job
descriptions. Information about the reform, its approaches, the new tasks and powers
must be transferred systematically. Up to now, the flow of information was absolutely
informal, so that it must not surprise that Foresters and Forest Guards have a wrong
(and rather negative) picture of the FSP reform. If information channe ls would be
institutiona l ized, the new approach could certa inly ga in more support in the fie ld,
bringing ‚far-away Peshawar’ closer to the Territorial Staff ’s ground realities.
The initia l dec ision not to involve the TS in discussing the reform shows that no
bottom-up communication exists within the department. To change that, the FD has to
provide an institutionalized forum, in which the field staff can communicate their own
field experience to the higher levels of the department. The role of Forest Guards and
Foresters is often under-estimated, as Poffenberger writes: “Beat officers are perhaps
more strategically positioned and practically informed than any other agency individual
(…) they can serve as the eyes and ears of the forest department ’s programme-
monitoring”. (1996, 236)
7.3.2 Territorial Staff – CDEGD Field Staff
Improve accepta nce of CDEGD field st a f f
In order to secure the powers of the C D E G D fie ld staff , they need better working
conditions, i.e. long-term contracts. As the TS know about the short-term contracts
C D E G D offic ia ls have , they are not interested to establish any serious working
relations (the CDO might be sacked again after three months). Moreover, short-term
contracts hardly motivate the CDEGD staff to get involved with V LUP and to develop
sustainable working practices.
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The abovementioned, better information of the TS would also improve the CDEGD
staff ’s acceptance. As soon as the TS rea l ize that V L UP is not only a temporary
exercise, and that the FSP reforms concern the whole department, their perception of
the CDEGD staff might change.
Reduce dependence on DFO /  RO
To reduce the CDOs dependence on DFOs and/or ROs, their co-operation with their
own directorate should be improved. A t present, both CDOs and FFEs are working in
isolation, without any regular contact to superiors in their directorate. The appointment
of assistant directors on field level might improve the situation, yet it will not solve the
ma in problem. As long as C D Os are assessed by a D F O or a RO – people who
sometimes disfavor the FSP approach as a whole – their job situation will remain too
insecure. As long as the TS has a hand in sacking CDEGD staff, an open discourse on
V LUP is not possible on field level. The fact that most CDEGD officials insisted that
their names must not me mentioned in this study additionally illustrates their unease.
Not only is the CDEGD field staff ’s job security highly dependent on the TS, but also
their dai ly affairs. Some CDOs complained their complete dependence on a D F O ’s
dec isions. The ir freedom to plan professiona l activities was very much limited by
internal restrictions. One CDO was abused for office work, which was not at all related
to his job, while meetings with local committees had to be cancel led. That is why
C D E G D off ic ia ls must be given more dec ision-making power on the ir own
professiona l activities. Partic ipatory natura l management such as V L UP requires a
f lexible and creat ive working style . Under the current c ircumstances, this is not
possible.
7.3.3 Territorial Staff – local people (general relations)
Int roduce new per mit p rocedure as established in Meth a l
The introduction of the model established in Methal seems to be the only way to solve
the endless quarre ls about the permit procedure in Protected and Guzara Forests.
Me thal  made very good experiences by involving the loca l JF M committee in the
procedure , so that both the department and loca l people can control each other.
However, this requires that a committee has reached a certain stage of maturity and has
established a common sense.
Accept obliga tions within FSP approach
As long as some FD officials do not consequently enforce the law, people will accept
the FD ’s authority only if they can benefit from doing so. Supposedly, the Territorial
Staff ’s acceptance will increase as soon as local people realize that Foresters and Forest
Guards can help to generate real benefits through V illage Land Use Planning. This
requires, however, that the TS accept their obligations within the FSP approach, giving
a true input and supporting the local committees.
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7.3.4 Forest Department – VDCs /WOs
Establish regula r  com munica tion between the FD a nd loca l com mittees
The communication gap between the FD and local committees is closely interlinked
with the communicat ion gap between the TS and the C D E G D fie ld staff . If the
department officials would succeed to build a team, communication with local people
would certainly improve. A certain regularity seems crucial, especially in the beginning
of the V LUP process. If monthly committee meetings fail after few months already, the
probabil ity that the whole process breaks down increases. In Che l  (Swat), three
consecutive meetings of the V DC did not take place due to different reasons (mistakes
were made both by the FD and the V DC), so that local people lost their interest.
Reassess Village La nd Use Pla nning p rocess
If the copy-paste style in V illage Land Use Plans is caused by the CDEGD officials’
huge workload, it might help to involve local NGOs in V LUP. Such a co-operation
would reduce the pressure now weighing upon CDOs. Due to financial constraints, the
possibility that the CDEGD directorate would hire more staff for the field level seems
rather unrealistic at the moment.
Besides that, the usefulness of the intervention-packages used for V L UP must be
questioned. Many of the trainings proposed are of no much use for local people. In
order to find local solutions for local problems, trainings should be locally specific and
be based upon people ’s own priorities whenever possible.
Avoid r a ising too high expect a tions
This is not only a fault of the FD , as people often raise unrealistic hopes on their own.
Y et while giving pre l iminary information about V L UP, the F D must be open and
honest, so that people remain realistic in their expectations. O therwise, the acceptance
of a V DC/WO will decrease quickly again.
A lthough V DCs are not (yet) concerned with Joint Forest Management, the idea of
involving V DCs in the permit procedure should be considered. Experience from Methal
has shown that the JFMC’s acceptance is mainly based on the (partly financial) benefits
people rece ive through the improved permi t procedure . Establishing a similar
procedure in other areas would he lp to increase the acceptance both of loca l
committees and the FD .
Suppor t TS in its double-role
The Forest Ordinance has been written and promulgated, so this cannot be changed
anymore. It is even advantageous that the TS have to play their part in V LUP, so that
sooner or later, their attitude towards local people might change. However, it must not
be ignored that FGs, Fs and ROs have to fulfil many different tasks now. As soon as
addit iona l committees are established in the same areas, they will be complete ly
overburdened with work . The involvement of N G Os thus becomes an absolute
necessity, which can help to release pressure from the TS. O ther institutions such as the
Front ier Constabulary in Hazara could support the TS in forest protec t ion.
Nevertheless, the TS must play their part in V LUP/JFM . O therwise, many of them will
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continue using informal practices. which run counter to participatory natural resource
management.
Ma ke loca l com mittees united
It is the task of CDOs in particular to unite committees and to make sure that they
cannot be dominated by loca l é l ites. Leading figures in a committee – president,
secretary, treasurer – must represent different khe ls and soc ia l c lasses, so that poor
people ’s concerns of be ing ignored by the V D C can be appeased. The idea of a
changing presidency every (second) year could be considered. Y et even common
members or outsiders could potentia l ly dominate a committee. However, a strong
WO/V DC will be able to deal with differing opinions among its members.
Local committees would be strengthened when linked with other partners from the
private sector, or with NGOs (in Shungli , for instance, SRSP could be a good partner).
Such partners could mediate when conflicts between the FD and a committee arise.
7.3.5 Forest Department – Local Government
H a z a r a : establish basic co-oper a tion
Under the current circumstances, one must not expect that the FD would start to co-
operate with the existing Forest Protection Committeee of the District Counci l. The
only possible solution would be that the FPC reconstitutes itself in order to become
more representative – an option that does not seem very realistic at the moment.
Swat: endow existing co-oper a tion with decision-m a king power
If the Forest Department really wants to show its will for decentralized structures, the
co-operation between the F D and the D istrict Counc i l in Mingora must receive a
minimum of  dec ision-making powers and funds. A  spec ia l fund for the joint
implementation of smal l-scale pilot activities on district level should be considered,
which could be financed jointly by both parties. This would at least give a chance to
this unique and promising co-operation.
The involvement of other partners in this kind of co-operation could be considered.
Representatives from the private sector and from loca l N G Os could give va luable
inputs. Thus, the idea of Forest Round Tables, a stakeholder forum on provincial level,
which has been established in the course of the reforms, could be introduced on district
level.
DFOs should be given an opportunity to prove that problems can be solved on district
level. If they complain that Peshawar was too far away and that the FSP reforms were
unrealistic, they should at least have an opportunity to demonstrate the district level ’s
ability to tackle its own problems.
Ma ke use of existing links within VDCs /WOs
Up to now, V LUP did not capitalise on the fact that many members of V DCs and WOs
are also on a Union Council. Such links could become very valuable in future. If one
day, the Union Councils should become vested with more powers and funds (what, in
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fact, is highly questionable), V DCs and WOs could be ideal partners for carrying out
local interventions. But even now, councillors on local committees could act as fund-
raisers, since many of them have excel lent social assets in their respective area. FD
officials working with local committees should pay more attention to this option.
Avoid pa r a llel institutions
Another link to the Local Government could be that V DCs and WOs would do the job
of the V il lage Counc i ls (V C) and C it izen Community Boards (C C B), which are
foreseen in the Local Government Plan 2000. This would mean that local committees
would hold regular meetings with their Union Council, or that councillors would attend
the monthly committee meetings. However, this only makes sense when the loca l
committees reached a certain stage of maturity and unity. While a strong committee
would be able to profit from such a co-operation, weak committees would run the risk
of being dominated by the politicians. Be that as it may – as long as no real fiscal
decentralization takes place within the Local Government, there is only little interest
for local committees to seek this partnership.
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